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i s s u e but upon p r o b a b l e caus£ s u p p o r t e d by o a t h or 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
A p p e l l a n t and t h r e e o t h e r t ee r t age boys went t o t h e i r 
f a m i l y cab in at Lake town , on Bear Lake t o h e l p c l o s e i t f o r the 
w i n t e r . The o p e r a t o r of t h e Old Rock S t o r e a c c u s e d one of t h e 
o t h e r boys of s h o p l i f t i n g a 12 pack of b e e r , but d id not d e t a i n 
him, and t hen c a l l e d t h e County S h e r i f f , who went t o t h e 
c a b i n s , a c c o s t e d A p p e l l a n t , i n one c a p i n , and p l a c e d him u n d e r 
a r r e s t , ( T r a n s . Motion t o S u p p r e s s , pp 5 3 , 5 4 , 5 5 . ) The s h e r i f f 
d i d no t a t t h a t t ime have a W a r r a n t , no r had he o b s e r v e d t h e 
i n c i d e n t ( T r a n s . Motion to S u p p r e s s , P . 5 1 - 5 4 ) . The S h e r i f f 
t h e n took a p p e l l a n t t o the o t h e r c a b i h , where he l a t e r found a 
can of b e e r on t h e f l o o r . 
The s h e r i f f a t t e m p t e d t o handcujff a p p e l l a n t , (Motion to 
S u p p r e s s , T r a n s . P 2 6 0 . ) who p a s s i v e l y r e s i s t e d , and demanded 
to s ee t h e war ran t o f a r r e s t , or s e a r c h w a r r a n t . ( T r a n s , of 
Motion to S u p p r e s s , P. 5 9 ) . The s h e r i f f s t a t e d he needed none, 
and p r o c e e d e d t o u s e f o r c e , even drawing h i s gun and 
t h r e a t e n i n g t o blow t h e boys 1 heads p f f . When t h e d e f e n d a n t 
r e fused t o submit t o t h e s h e r i f f ' s b u l l y i n g , t h e s h e r i f f l e f t , 
and c a l l e d for o t h e r o f f i c e r s . 
4. 
Af te r the o f f i c e r s took t h e boys t o j a i l , and t h e i r 
a t t o r n e y a r r i v e d , t h e s h e r i f f o b t a i n e d a s e a r c h w a r r a n t from 
t h e l o c a l J D , and r e t u r n e d t o t h e c a b i n , making a d e t a i l e d 
s e a r c h of t h e c a b i n and the boys c a r ; f i n d i n g no e v i d e n c e of 
t h e 12 pack . The w a r r a n t s p e c i f i c a l l y named i t e m s , b e e r c a n s , 
c a r t o n , e t c , bu t none were f o u n d . The s h e r i f f c l a i m e d they had 
been d r i n k i n g , bu t r e f u s e d t o g i v e them a b r e a t h t e s t , which 
would have e x h o n o r a t e d a p p e l l a n t . 
The boys were h e l d , w i t h o u t be ing t a k e n b e f o r e a 
m a q i s t r a t e for more t h a n four hours ( a l t h o u g h the JP was in t h e 
b u i l d i n g , and s i g n e d the Search W a r r a n t ) , on t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s 
a t t o r n e y i n s i s t a n c e t h a t t h e boys be c h a r g e d or r e l e a s e d , t h e 
s h e r i f f ' s deputy f i l e d c h a r g e s on a t i c k e t , i n t h e JP c o u r t ; 
a p p e l l a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h P o s s e s s i o n of A l c o h o l , Thef t and 
In t e r f e r a n e e with a P o l i c e O f f i c e r ( a l l c l a s s B M i s d e m e a n o r s ) . 
When t h e JP r e l e a s e d t h e boys t o t h e i r a t t o r n e y , t h e 
S h e r i f f u n l a w f u l l y i^efused t o l e t them out of j a i l , s a y i n g he 
was g o i n g to c h a r g e them w i t h a d d i t i o n a l o f f e n s e s . The a t t o r n e y 
a r r a n g e d bond with t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t , (on t h e u n s p e c i f i e d 
c h a r g e s ) . S ix weeks l a t e r , t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y f i l e d an 
i n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g i n g ; R e t a i l The f t , ( u n d e r a d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n ) 
J n l a w f u l P o s s e s s i o n , and A s s a u l t i n g an O f f i c e r , a c l a s s A 
Mi s demeano r . The Cbunty A t t o r n e y f i l e d a mo t ion to t r a n s f e r 
the t h r e e C l a s s B Misdemeanors d e s c r i b e d on t i c k e t v i o l a t i o n s 
t o t h e C i r c u i t from t h e JP c o u r t , which was g r a n t e d , o v e r 
c o u n s e l f s o b j e c t i o n . The County A t t o r n e y now a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e 
was no amendment of the o r i g i n a l c h a r g e s . 
A S u p p r e s s i o n Hear ing was h e l d , where t h e s t o r e k e e p e r 
a d m i t t e d t h a t a t t h e t ime of t h e s u s p e c t e d s h o p l i f t i n g , t h i s 
a p p e l l a n t was no t even in t h e s t o r e . ( T r a n s . Motion t o 
S u p p r e s s , pp 8-9) No e v i d e n c e was adduced to i n d i c a t e any 
i nvo lvemen t of a n p e l l a n t as an a c c o m p l i c e . No e v i d e n c e was 
adduced t o a s s e r t any e x c e p t i o n to t h e A r r e s t s t a t u t e , i . e . 
5. 
t h a t t h e o f f i c e r may a r r e s t i f h e f 0 a r s t h e e v i d e n c e w i l l b e 
d e s t r o y e d , or c o n c e a l e d . 
The o n e u n o p e n e d c a n of b e e r f o u n d b e f o r e t h e w a r r a n t was 
b j e c t i v e w i t n e s s , S a n d r a 
h e r h u s b a n d a r e t h e o n l y 
i s s u e d , was a c c o u n t e d f o r by an o\i 
H a r d i n g , who a d m i t t e d t h a t s h e a n d 
H a r d i n g f a m i l y members who d r i n k a l c o h o l , and t h a t one o f t h e i r 
c a b i n g u e s t s had l e f t t h e b e e r , u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y t h e week 
b e f o r e . Hie b o y s w e r e u n a w a r e of t h e b e e r . ( T r a n s . M o t i o n t o 
S u p p r e s s , P5 7 ) J u d g e P e r r y g r a t u i t o u s l y f o u n d t h a t t h e o f f i c e r 
d i d n o t need a w a r r a n t i f he f e a r s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e may be 
d e s t r o y e d o r c o n c e a l e d , a p r o p o s i t i o n n e v e r b e i n g m e n t i o n e d by 
t h e c o u n t y o r any w i t n e s s . The s h e r i f f ' s r e t u r n on t h e ex p o s t 
f a c t o S e a r c h W a r r a n t d o e s n o t m e n t i o n t h e c a n of b e e r . 
On a t r i a l by j u r y , t h e s t o r e k e e p e r r e p e a t e d h e r 
r e c o l l e c t i o n t h a t A p p e l l a n t was n o t i n v o l v e d i n t a k i n g a n y t h i n g 
from h e r s t o r e , and t h a t s h e t o l d t h e ( S h e r i f f s o . I t i s i n h i s 
r e p o r t of t h e i n c i d e n t . He made h i s a j r r e s t b a s e d s o l e l y on t h e 
p h o n e r e p o r t t h a t one of f o u r y o u t h s May h a v e t a k e n some b e e r . 
He had n o r e a s o n t o s u s p e c t t h a t A p p e l 
A f t e r t r i a l , a n d s e n t e n c i n g , A p p e l l a n t f i l e d an a p p e a l , 
a t w h i c h c o u n s e l w e r e g i v e n 8 m i n u t e s t o a r g u e t h e i r p o s i t i o n s ; 
a l l t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a r g u m e n t r a i s e d , t h e s t a t u t e s v i o l a t e d , 
we r^ i g n o r e d , and t h e A p p e a l s C o u r t a f f i r m e d w i t h o u t c o m m e n t . 
B a s i s f o r t h i s p e t i t i o n i s found i n t h e f a c t t h a t 
n u m e r o u s c a s e s from t h i s c o u r t q u o t e d h e r e a f t e r a r e i n c o n f l i c t 
w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t , w h i c h a p p a r e n t l y w e r e 
a d o p t e d w h o l e s a l e by t h e c o u r t o f A p p e a l s . ( R i l e 4 3 ( 2 ) a n d 
4 3 ( 3 ) , R u l e s o f t h e U t a h Supreme C o u r t . 
a n t was t h a t o n e , 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT] OF CERTIOARI : 
POINT ONE: THE ARREST HAS ILLEGAL 
6. 
1/ Freedom from the fear of unwarranted a r r e s t i s one of 
the most sac rosanc t of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p ro t ec t ed r i g h t s . Both 
t h e f ede ra l C o n s t i t u t i o n and our Utah S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n use 
e s s e n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l language: 
A r t i c l e I Section 14 , Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n : 
"The r ight of the people to be secure in t h e i r pe rsons , 
houses , papers and e f f e c t s aga ins t unreasonable searches 
and s e i z u r e s s h a l l not be v i o l a t e d ; and no warrant s h a l l 
i s s u e but upon p robab le cause supported by oath or 
a f f i r m a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y desc r ib ing t h e p l ace to be 
searched and the person or thing to be s i e z e d . " 
2. Our S ta te L e g i s l a t u r e has b u t t r e s s e d t h i s p r o v i s i o n of 
t h e law, and ref ined t h e p r o h i b i t i o n by def in ing what 
c o n s t i t u t e s an a r r e s t : 
77-7-1 UCA: "An a r r e s t i s an ac tua l r e s t r a i n t of 
t h e person a r r e s t e d or submission to cus tody . The person 
s h a l l not be sub jec ted to any more r e s t r a i n t than i s 
necessary for his a r r e s t and d e t e n t i o n . " 
3 . 77-7-2 UCA a u t h o r i z e s a peace o f f i c e r to make an 
a r r e s t when he has a war ran t , but he may a r r e s t without a 
warrant on ly : 
( l )For any pub l i c of fense committed or a t tempted 
in the p re sence of any peace o f f i c e r . . . or 
(2) when he has reasonab le cause to be l i eve a 
felony has been committed and has reasonable 
cause to b e l i e v e t h a t t he person a r r e s t e d has 
comm i t t e d i t . or 
(3 ) when he has reasonable cause to be l i eve t h e 
person has committed a p u b l i c o f f e n s e , and there 
i s reasonable cause fo r be l i ev ing the person may: 
( a ) f l e e or conceal himself to avoid a r r e s t ; 
(b )des t roy or concea l evidence of the commission 
of the o f fense ; or 
( c ) i n j u r e another person or damage p r o p e r t y 
belonging t o another p e r s o n . 
4 . Although at t he Suppression Hearing, Judge Per ry 
gr at ui t i o u s l y r e fe r r ed t o the excep t ions in (3) above, (Trans, 
of Suopression Hear ing , P66) none were t e s t i f i e d t o , by any 
w i t n e s s , nor even mentioned by t h e County A t t o r n e y . See Welsh 
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v . W i s c o n s i n , 104 S .Ct . 2091, 80 L . E d . 2 d 732 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . E x i g e n t 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y a w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t a r e 
t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s burden t o p r o v e . ( S t p t e v s . Mendoza 748 P . 2d 
181) . As s t a t e d by t h e c o u r t in Oregon v s . R o b e r t s , 706 P.2d 
56 4, a t 566, the o f f i c e r s might j u s t i f y a w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t , 
had t h e y i n t e n d e d to o b t a i n e v i d e n c e of a l c o h o l i n t h e p e r s o n s 
body f l u i d s , which they f ea r may d i s s i p a t e or some s i m i l a r 
e x ig ency; however , p o l i c e o f f i c e r s c a n n o t c r e a t e t h e i r own 
ex ige nc i e s by f a i l i n g t o f a m i l i a r i z e thems e 1 ves wit h 
cons t i t u t i o n a l l y mandated pr o c e d u r e ^ . In t h i s c a s e , t h e 
o f f i c e r c o u l d have c a l l e d i n on h i s c a r r a d i o , as he d i d a few 
m i n u t e s l a t e r , and have had d e l i v e r e d to him a w a r r a n t ; or he 
may have had h i s d i s p a t c h e r o b t a i n a t e l e p h o n i c w a r r a n t , i n 
n u n u t e s . He e l e c t e d to do n e i t h e r . 
5. I t was improper for Judge f £ r r y t o s imply sweep away 
a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s wi th no e v i d e n c e in f r o n t of 
him L i a t a p p e l l a n t was a b o u t t o f l e e , or c o n c e a l h i m s e l f o r t h e 
e v i d e n c e , or t h a t i n j u r y would r e s u l t . ( S t a t e v s . R o b e r t s 707 
P . 2d 564. O r e . 198 5. The e v i d e n c e wafs t h a t t h e four boys were 
t h e r e to c J o s e up t h e c a b i n for t h e w i n t e r , and would be j o i n e d 
l a t e r t h a t day by r e s p o n s i b l e a d u | l t s . Any c l a im of t h e 
s h e r i f f , t h a t he c o u l d no t have o b t a i n e d a w a r r a n t or s e a r c h 
w a r r a n t t o j u s t i f y h i s e n t r y i n t o thfe c a b i n i s s imply u n t r u e . 
He p roved t h a t by o b t a i n i n g an a f t i r t h e f a c t w a r r a n t . He 
c o u l d e a s i l y have o b t a i n e d a t e l e p h o p i c w a r r a n t a s a u t h o r i z e d 
under 7 7 - 7 - 1 0 UCA. ( S t a t e v s . Ruber t , 612 P .2d 771 , O r e . ) 
6. The f r u i t l e s s n e s s of an ' a f t e r t h e f a c t ' w a r r a n t i s 
d i s c u s s e d in S t a t e v s . Hygh , 711 P .2d 265; such a s e a r c h i s 
p r e t e x t ual and not s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e o r i g i n a l un lawfu l 
s e a r c h and s i e z u r e . 
7. The s h e r i f f c l a imed t o t h e boys t h a t he did not need a 
s e a r c h o r a r r e s t w a r r a n t , ( T r a n s , of (Suppression Hea r ing , p . 4 3 ; 
T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t P260 ) . Th i s c o u r t has however d e l i n e a t e d t h e 
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need for a s p e c i f i c s e a r c h w a r r a n t , ( s e e S t a t e v s . G a l l e g o s , 
712 P.2d 207, and S t a t e v s . Mendoza, 748 P .2d 18 1) and in t h a t 
and many o t h e r c a s e s , d e c l a r e d t h a t the d e c i s i o n as to what may 
be s e i z e d , and who, i s a j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n , no t an 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o n e . As a p p l i e d t o t h i s c a s e , t h e o f f i c e r had 
o r o b a b l e cause to b e l i e v e t h a t some one of the fou r young men 
may have s h o p l i f t e d . L a t e r d i s c l o s u r e s , by t h e c o m p l a i n i n g 
w i t n e s s e x h o n o r a t e d t h i s a p p e l l a n t , d e s t r o y i n g t h e s h e r i f f ' s 
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t he had a u t h o r i t y t o make a w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t 
and s e a r c h . He e f f e c t u a t e d t h e a r r e s t i n t h e e a s t c a b i n , 
( T r a n s , of Sups r e s si on H e a r i n g , P 53) which i s s e p a r a t e f rom 
the wes t c a b i n where t h e S h e r i f f l a t e r found a can of b e e r , 
l e f t on t h e f l o o r by e a r l i e r c a b i n u s e r s . That c an , o b t a i n e d 
u n l a w f u l l y , because of the e a r l i e r u n l a w f u l and faLse a r r e s t , 
shou ld have been e x c l u d e d from t h e e v i d e n c e , a s r e q u e s t e d a t 
t h e S u p p r e s s i o n H e a r i n g . (Chimel v s . C a l i f o r n i a , 395 U . S . 752 ; 
89 S .Ct . 2034; 23 L.Rd. 2d 6 8 5 ) . 
8. The pu rpose of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t 
u n l a w f u l s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s , and t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e 
p o l i c e have p r o o f of e x i g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s befo re making a 
w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t i s we l l i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h i s c a s e . 
An i n n o c e n t p e r s o n i s s u s p e c t e d by t h e o f f i c e r based 
s o l e l y on t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of a c a r . I f t h e o f f i c e r had 
f o l l o w e d t h e r u l e s , and p r e s e n t e d a War ran t , a l l of t h e boys 
would have s u b n i t t e d , of c o u r s e , t o h i s s e a r c h . Their p a s s i v e 
r e s i s t a n c e , a g a i n s t a w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t , by a man i n cowboy 
c l o t h i n g , i s f u l l y j u s t i f i e d . (See Utah v s . B radshaw, 541 P . 2d 
8 0 0 ) . The Bradshaw c a s e , i n which t h i s c o u r t s t r u c k down t h e 
former 76 -8 -305 UCA, which a u t h o r i z e d a p e a c e o f f i c e r t o make 
an a r r e s t , " r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r t h e r e i s a l e g a l b a s i s fo r 
t h e a r e s t " , i s very i n s t r u c t i v e a s a p p l i e d t o t h i s c a s e . The 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r e s t p r o v i s i o n s are i n t e n d e d to a v o i d t h i s 
t y p e of e r r o r by t h e o f f i c e r . They a r e for h i s p r o t e c t i o n as 
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w e l l a s t h e i n n o c e n t c i t i z e n . (In t h e i n t e r e s t of I . , R .L . a 
p e r s o n under E i g h t e e n Y e a r s , Ct of A p p e a l s of Utah 739 P .2d 
1 1 2 3 , 1987 ) 
Having i g n o r e d t h e War ran t p r o v i s i o n s , t h e o f f i c e r 
e l e c t e d no t t o s imply g i v e t h e s u s p e c t s a t i c k e t , as 
a n t i c i p a t e d by 77-7 -18 UCA, bu t i n s t e a d p r o c e e d e d t o f o r c e a b l y 
handcuf f t h e i n n o c e n t y o u t h s . When he met p a s s i v e r e s i s t a n c e , 
and now c l a i m i n g t h a t he was fearfu]J f o r h i s own s a f e t y , t h e 
o f f i c e r p u l l s h i s g u n , b r a n d i s h e s i t pnd t h r e a t e n s t o k i l l t he 
f o u r y o u t h s . When t h e y c o n t i n u e t o a | s s e r t t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r i g h t s , and demand t o see h i s warrant , , t h e s h e r i f f l e f t , c a l l e d 
f o r backup; t h e n w i t h an a t t a c k dog and four o t h e r o f f i c e r s 
c a r r y i n g s h o t g u n s , p u l l a Miami Vice t y p e r a i d , f o r c e a b l y 
subduing a p p e l l a n t and t h e o t h e r s . 
A s imple s h o p l i f t i n g i n c i d e n t ( o c c u r r i n g o u t s i d e t he 
p r e s e n c e of t h e o f f i c e r , ) was e s c a l a t e d by him i n t o a l i f e 
t h r e a t e n i n g i n c i d e n t i n which t h e o f f i c e r was t h e s o l e 
a g g r e s s o r . Not c o n t e n t t o subdue t h e f r i g h t e n e d boys and hau l 
them of f i n c h a i n s , the o f f i c e r then b a i l e d to i m m e d i a t e l y t ake 
them b e f o r e a m a g i s t r a t e , bu t put therh i n j a i l , w i t h o u t c h a r g e , 
w h i l e he o b t a i n e d an ex p o s t f a c t b Search W a r r a n t , i n an 
o b v i o u s (bu t u n s u c c e s s f u l ) a t t e m p t to o b t a i n t h e e v i d e n c e 
which he shou ld have had b e f o r e h i s a b u s i v e and un lawfu l a r r e s t . 
F u r t h e r compounding h i s f a l s e ^ r r e s t , t h e o f f i c e r , when 
pushed i n t o f i l i n g c h a r g e s , f i l e d thjree c h a r g e s a g a i n s t e a c h 
boy i n t h e JP c o u r t . Upon r e l e a s e of t h e boys by t h e J P , t h e 
s h e r i f f f u r t h e r compounded h i s u n l a w f u l b u l l y i n g ; a s s e r t i n g 
t h a t he would f i l e f u r t h e r c h a r g e s , he u n l a w f u l l y r e f u s e d to 
r e l e a s e t h e b o y s . F u r t h e r c h a r g e s , i n t h e form of a n 
I n f o r m a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a more s e r i o u ^ c h a r g e , were no t f i l e d 
u n t i l s i x wee ks l a t e r . An a s t o u n d i n g t o t a l of s i x t e e n c h a r g e s 
w* re f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e four b o y s , a l l a r i s i n g out of t h i s 
m i s h a n d l e d s i t u a t i o n , which s h o u l d have been h a n d l e d by the 
i s s u a n c e of a s i n g l e s h o p l i f t i n g t i c k e t a g a i n s t one boy. (The 
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County At torney th rea tened t o f i l e s e v e r a l o ther charges 
a g a i n s t another of the boys , forc ing him in to a p lea b a r g a i n . ) 
The undersigned was requ i red t o con tac t the C i rcu i t Court Judge 
(who in fac t was without j u r i s d i c t i o n , the only charges at tha t 
time having been f i l ed in the JP Court) and have him se t ba i l 
on a charge which was not even f i l e d u n t i l s i x weeks l a t e r . I t 
was ev iden t from h i s a c t i o n s tha t t h e s h e r i f f , in t h i s case , 
f u l l y intended t o hold these young boys, two 18 year o l d s , and 
two 16 year o l d s , in h i s j a i l over t h e weekend, (a l i t t l e 
ounishment before t r i a l ) without any C i r cu i t Court charges 
being f i l e d , when t h e r e was ample t ime , because counsel was 
t h e r e to i n s i s t on i t , to p rocess t h e boys and have them 
re lea sed. 
The abuses of a t y r a n t , once he has passed the po in t 
where t h e law should s t o p him, are without l i m i t . Simple 
adherance to the Ar res t s t a t u t e s and C o n s t i t u t i o n would have 
avoided a l l of t h i s . Although t h i s Court in S t a t e vs. 
Bradshaw, supra , s t ruck down as u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l the 
" r ega rd le s s of whether there i s a l ega l b a s i s for t he a r r e s t " 
p r o v i s i o n , the p rosecu t ion in t h i s case cont inued to a rgue , as 
Mr. Preston did t o t h i s j u r y , tha t r e g a r d l e s s of t h e lawfulness 
of t h e a r r e s t , the a r r e s t e e i s required to submit , (see T r i a l 
T r a n s c r i p t , P357), a f a l s e and f r i g h t e n i n g concept . 
This appe l l an t i s in e x a c t l y tha t p o s i t i o n descr ibed by 
Judge Henroid in h i s concurr ing opin ion in Bradshaw, P 803, 
" I suggest the sub jec t s t a t u t e both permi ts and 
encourage an unreasonab le - and I t h i n k , u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
a r r e s t , when i t says i t i s unlawful t o i n t e r f e r with a 
law enforcement o f f i c i a l who t r i e s to make an a r r e s t 
"whether the re i s a l ega l b a s i s for the a r r e s t " or n o t . 
In o ther words, a peaceful c i t i z e n i s forced by 
l e g i s l a t i o n to become h i s own j a i l b a i t , i f he 
" i n t e r f e r e s " with a law enforcement o f f i c i a l making an 
a r r e s t , no ma t t e r how o u t r a g e o u s , v i c i o u s or s t u p i d i t 
may be- and if such c i t i z e n uses means t h a t t he s t a t u t e 
seems by imp l i ca t ion or legerdemain , to be an a r b i t r a r y 
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e x e r c i s e of p o o r j u d g m e n t , but i n do ing so i n t e r f e r e s 
wi th an o f f i c e r , — i t c o s t s him s i x months d e p r i v a t i o n of 
h i s l i b e r t y . 
POINT TWO. 
ILLEGALLY OBrAINED EVIDENCE SHQULD BE SUPPRESSED: 
1 . The d o c t r i n e of s u p p r e s s i o n of i l l e g a l l y o b t a i n e d 
e v i d e n c e i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h e c a s e of S t a t e v s . G a l l e g o s 
712 P.2d 207, d e c i d e d by t h i s c o u r t in 1985. G a l l e g o s was 
d i f f e r e n t from t h i s c a s e , i n t h a t i n G a l l e g o s , t h e o f f i c e r s did 
have a S e a r c h W a r r a n t , in t h i s one , t h e s h e r i f f d id n o t . 
2 . P r i o r t o t r i a l t h e d e f e n d a n t G a l l e g o s f i l e d a Motion 
t o S u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e of i t e m s d i s c o v e r e d , which were i n f a c t 
l a t e r found t o be s t o l e n , but were not d e s c r i b e d i n t he S e a r c h 
W a r r a n t . The s t a t e a rgued t h a t w h i l e l a w f u l l y i n t h e home of 
G a l l e g o s , t he o f f i c e r i n i t i a t e d an i n d e o e n d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n , 
which then gave him p r o b a b l e cause t o s e i z e t h e c o n t e s t e d i t e m s 
( n o t d e s c r i b e d on the W a r r a n t ) . That same a rgument was made by 
Mr. P r e s t o n , and shou ld l i k e w i s e be r e j e c t e d h e r e . 
3 . The G a l l e g o s c a s e r e s u l t e d in a r e v e r s a l of t h e lower 
c o u r t s 1 d e n i a ] of d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion to S u p p r e s s , w i th t h i s 
comment, from p 211 , which i s a p p l i c a b l e h e r e i n : 
" O f f i c e r G e s l i s o n ' s s u b s e q u e n t d i s c o v e r y of t h e m i s s i n g 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers and d i s c o v e r y t h e nex t day t n a t 
t h e p r o p e r t y was in f a c t s to le f t , d i d n o t d i s s i p a t e t h e 
o r i g i n a l t a i n t . Af f i rmance o t t h i s t y p e of p o l i c e 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n would have t h e p r o s c r i b e d e f f e c t of 
a l l o w i n g p o l i c e t o s e a r c h under 3 g e n e r a l w a r r a n t . 
P o l i c e cannot e n t e r a p p r ^ o n ' s home based upon 
a s e a r c h w a r r a n t and w h i l e t h e r e i n i t i a t e and c o n c l u d e an 
independen t o u t s i d e i n v e s t i g a t i 
c ause t o s e i z e unnamed p r o p e r t y . . on 
t o a c h i e v e p r o b a b l e 
4 . The s h e r i f f , h a v i n g o n l y a s u s p i c i o n t h a t one of four 
boys had s h o p l i f t e d some i t e m s , s h o u l d have o b t a i n e d a w a r r a n t , 
a t t h . t t i m e , not l a t e r . His s u b s e q u e n t f i n d i n g of a can of 
b e e r , which the c o u r t w r o n g f u l l y a l l o w e d t o be used a s 
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e v i d e n c e , p r e j u d i c e d t h e w h o l e c a s e , so much s o , t h a t e v e n when 
t h e d e f e n s e p r e s e n t e d a w i t n e s s who e x o n o r a t e d a p p e l l a n t , 
( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t , p p 3 2 2 , 3 23) t h e d a m a g e was d o n e , and t h e 
j u r y d i s b e l i e v e d t h e w i t n e s s . 
5. The s h e r i f f c l a i m e d t h a t t h e r e p o r t e d s h o p l i f t i n g , 
w i t h a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c a r d r i v e n by a p p e l l a n t c o n s t i t u t e d 
o r o b a b l e c a u s e t o a r r e s t . I t may have g i v e n him p r o b a b l e c a u s e 
t o a r r e s t s o m e o n e , b u t n o t t h i s a p p e l l a n t . The two e l e m e n t s of 
r e a s o n a b l e c a u s e a s e x p r e s s e d i n 7 7 - 7 - 2 ( 3 ) IJCA a r e t h a t t h e 
o f f i c e r h a s r e a s o n a b l e c a u s e t o b e l i e v e t h a t a n o f f e n s e h a s 
o c c u r r e d , and t h a t t h e p e r s o n a r r e s t e d was t h e one who 
c o m m u t e d the o f f e n s e . He n e v e r a t any s t a g e of t h e i n c i d e n t 
had a n y f o r e k n o w l e d g e a s t o w h i c h o f t h e f o u r b o y s was 
s u s p e c t e d . To s i m p l y a r r e s t t h e f i r s t o n e of t h e fou r was no t 
r e a s o n a b l e . T h a t m i s t a k e p r e c i p i t a t e d a l l t h e v i o l a t i o n s o f 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s w h i c h f o l l o w e d . 
The e v i d e n c e s e i z e d a f t e r t h a t a r r e s t j s " t a i n t e d f r u i t 
o f t h e p o i s o n o u s t r e e " ( Ch imel v s . C a l i f o r n i a , s u p r a ) , and 
i t ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n s h o u l d h a v e b e e n s u p p r e s s e d . 
POl NT THREE: 
UNLAWFUL AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION TO HIGHER OFFENSE: 
1 . In t h i s c a s e , a s r e f e r r e d t o a b o v e , t h e d e f e n d a n t was 
o r i g i n a l l y c h a r g e d by C i t a t i o n , w i t h t h r e e C l a s s B m i s d e m e a n o r 
o f f e n s e s ; 1) p o s s e s s i o n o f a l c o h o l by a m i n o r , 2 ) t h e f t , and 3) 
I n t e r f e r a n c e w i t h a P e a c e O f f i c e r . He was a r r a i g n e d t h a t same 
d a y b e f o r e J u d g e Ray Cox, j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e , e n t e r i n g " n o t 
g u i l t y " p l e a s in e a c n i n s t a n c e . The j u s t i c e r e l e a s e d him on 
h i s own r e c o g n i z a n c e . T h i s o c c u r r e d on O c t o b e r 1 4 , 19 8 8, a t 
a b o u t 5 pm. 
1 3 . 
2 . The S h e r i f f , who was e x e c u t i n g a t t h a t t i m e , an ex 
p o s t f a c t o Search Warran t i s s u e d by Judge Cox, a t the c a b i n 
where A p p e l l a n t had been a r r e s t e d , t o l d h i s d e p u t y t o not 
r e l e a s e A p p e l l a n t and h i s f r i e n d s , (two of whom were minors ) 
bu t t o keep them in c u s t o d y b e c a u s e he was going t o f i l e 
f u r t h e r c h a r g e s i n C i r c u i t C o u r t . The boys were held i n 
c u s t o d y u n t i l the s h e r i f f r e t u r n e d t o t he j a i l a t 9:30 pm. The 
s h e r i f f was v i t r o l i c , having found none of t h e e v i d e n c e which 
he had d e s c r i b e d i n h i s a f f i d a v i t for t he s e a r c h w a r r a n t , as 
b e i n g e i t h e r a t t h e c a b i n or in A p p e l l a n t ' s c a r . He r e l e a s e d 
t h e boys o n l y a f t e r h i s depu ty c o n f i r m e d t h a t t h e C i r c u i t Court 
Judge , and the JP had both o rde red t h e i r r e l e a s e , and t h a t b a i l 
had been o o s t e d on t h e not y e t f i l e d , C i r c u i t Court c h a r g e s . 
3 . Under 77-7-21 UCA, when a pe r son r e c e i v i n g a c i t a t i o n 
for a misdemeanor o f f e n s e s i g n s the w r i t t e n p r o m i s e to appea r , 
and waives t h e f i l i n g of an I n f o r m a t i o n , t h e c i t a t i o n becomes 
t h e c o m p l a i n t . A p p e l l a n t was a r r a i g n e d , and p l e d no t g u i l t y to 
a l l char g o s . 
4 . S e c t i o n 77-3 5-4 (d)UCA s a y s ; 
11
 The c o u r t may p e r m i t an i n d i c t m e n t or I n f o r m a t i o n 
to be amended a t any t ime b e f o r e v e r d i c t i f no 
a d d i t i o n a l o r d i f f e r e n t o f f e n s e i s cha rged and t h e 
s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e d e f e n d a n t a r e no t 
p r e j udiced . " (EmphlfsTs aldded"J 
5. Uogradmg an o f f e n s e from ai C l a s s B Misdemeanor t o a 
C l a s s A Misdemeanor changes the p o t e n t i a l impr isonment from a 
maximum of s ix months t o a maximum of one y e a r . P 6-3-204 UCA), 
and i n c r e a s e s t h e p o t e n t i a l f ine from {31,000. t o |S2,500. 
(7 6-3-3 01 UCA) . 
6. Under t h e c i t a t i o n for which he was o r i g i n a l l y 
a r r a i g n e d , A p p e l l a n t was charged wi th t h r e e o f f e n s e s , a l l of 
which were C l a s s B Misdemeanors . Those c h a r g e s have neve r 
been d i s m i s s e d , but on November 1, 1988 t h e County A t t o r n e y 
f i l e d a Motion to T r a n s f e r to t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t , which Judge 
Cox 
1 4 . 
g r a n t e d November 4, 1 9 8 8 . On November 22, 1988 , t h e Cbunty 
A t t o r n e y f i l e d an I n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g i n g A p p e l l a n t w i t h 1) . 
R e t a i l Theft unde r 7 6 - 6 - 6 0 2 UCA ( t h e p r e v i o u s cha rge was T h e f t , 
under 7 6 -6 -412 UCA); 2 ) . Unlawful P o s s e s s i o n , unde r 32A-12-13 
UCA (same a s on t h e o r o v i o u s c i t a t i o n ) and 3 ) . A s s a u l t on a 
P o l i c e O f f i c e r under 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 2 . 4 UCA a C l a s s A Misdemeanor, ( t h e 
p r e v i o u s charge was I n t e r f e r a n c e under 7 6 - 8 - 3 0 5 UCA, a C l a s s 3 
Mi sdemeanor . ) 
7. A p p e l l a n t f i l e d a t i m e l y motion c o n t e s t i n g t h e 
amendment, a s a v i o l a t i o n of 77-35-4 ( d ) , which t h e C i r c u i t 
Court s u m m a r i l l y d e n i e d . There does n o t a p p e a r to be any 
d i s p o s i t i o n of a s i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n i n case l aw, but t h e a c t i o n s 
of t h e c o u n t y a r e o b v i o u s l y a v i o l a t i o n of t h e amendment 
s t a t u t e , and need t o be a d d r e s s e d by t h i s c o u r t . The who le 
c o n t e x t of t h i s c a s e i s one i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e a b u s e s which occur 
vhen t h e man c a r r y i n g t h e badge and i n f l u e n c e of t h e law i s 
a l l o w e d t o s u b v e r t the v e r y p u r p o s e s of t h e law and our 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . The p r e s u m p t i o n of i n n o c e n c e does n o t go very 
f a r , and i s no p r o t e c t i o n t o an i n n o c e n t p e r s o n i f t h e c o u r t s 
r e f u s e to do t h e i r d u t y , and g ive him t h o s e p r o t e c t i o n s . Judge 
D a i n e s , a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , copy a t t a c h e d , h i m s e l f 
commented t h a t t h i s was a s m a l l m a t t e r which g o t out of hand , 
and t h a t t h e o f f i c e r was r e s p o n s i b l e . ( S e n t e n c i n g H e a r i n g , P 13) 
CONCLUSION: 
T h i s case i s one of t h e most f l a g r a n t c a s e s of abuse of 
t h e p o l i c e power t h a t I have seen i n 26 y e a r s of p r a c t i c e . 
When a p e a c e o f f i c e r a b u s e s t h e l aw , and i s a l l o w e d t o ge t away 
w i t h i t by the c o u r t s , we a l l d i e a l i t t l e b i t . The Q i u r t OK 
A p p e a l s , a f f i r m i n g t h r e e c o n v i c t i o n s w i t h o u t even s t a t i n g why, 
i s a t o t a l f a i l u r e of the s y s t e m , and needs t o be a d d r e s s e d by 
t h i s c o u r t . 
1 5 . 
The r i g h t t o be s a f e f r o m a r r e s t , e x c e p t w i t h i n t h e 
b o u n d s s e t by o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l aw and o u r s t a t u t e s , i s f a r 
m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e s u s t a i n i n g , w i t h o u t c o m m e n t , o f an 
o b v i o u s l y f l a w e d p r o s e c u t i o n . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , t h i s 1 6 t h of A p r i l , 1 9 9 0 . 
Glen J . f | l l i s , f o r A p p e l l a n t 
NOTICE OF FILING AND MAILING: 
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The u n d e r s i g n e d , on t h i s 1 6 t h o f A p r i l , 1 9 9 0 , p e r s o n a l l y 
f i l e d t h e o r i g i n a l and 9 c o p i e s , i n w h i t e c o v e r s , o f t h e 
f o r e g o i n g P e t i t i o n f o r W r i t o f C e r t i o a r a r i w i t h t h e C l e r k o f 
t h e U t a h Supreme C o u r t , S t a t e C a p i t o l , SLC , U t a h 8 4 1 1 4 ; and 
m a i l e d two c o p i e s o f t h e same t o G e o r g e W. P r e s t o n , R i c h C o u n t y 
A t t o r n e y , Box 4 0 2 , R a n d o l p h , U t a h 8406 4 , w i t h a c o u r t e s y c o p y 
t o t h e C l e r k o f t h e Utah C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , 400 Midtown P l a z a , 
230 S 500 E , SLC, U t a h 8 4 1 0 2 , and t o t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f R i c h 
C b u n t y , R a n d o l p h D e p a r t m e n t , R i c h C o u n t y C o u r t h o u s e , R a n d o l p h , 
U t a h 8 4 0 6 4 , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , by U . S . M&il . 
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i . ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE, 3 / ] 5 /90 C t of A p p e a l s — o n e p a g e 
i i . P . 1 8 , TRANSCRTIP OF SENTENCING HEARING o n e p a g e 
i i i . AMENDED JUDGMENT & ORDER OF PROBATION one p a g e 
i v . STATE V S . BRAD SHAW, 5 41 P . 2d 80 0 -8 08 9 p a g e s 
v. STATE V S . HYGH, 7 1 1 P .2d 2 6 4 - 273 1 0 p a g e s 
v i . STATE V S . MENDOZA, 748 P . 2d 1 8 1 - 1 8 7 7 p a g e s 
v i i . STATE V S . GALLEGGG, 7 1 2 P .2d 2 0 7 - 211 4 p a g e s 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Reid H. Ellis, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Garff, Billings, and Davidson (Ori Rule 31 Panel) 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 890366-CA 
This matter is before the court pursuant to R. Utah 
App. 31. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the judgment is affirmed. 
DAT-ED" this y ^ day of March, 1990, 
FOR/THE COURT^ 
/ 
Reg"nal W. G a r f f , Judge' 
Appendix 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of March, 1990, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Affirmance was mailed to each 
of the following: 
Glen J. Ellis 
Attorney at Law 
Box 668 
Hurricane, UT 84737 
George Preston 
Rich County Attorney 
31 Federal Ave. 
Logan, UT 84321 
Hon. Robert W. Daines 
First Circuit Court 
Randloph Department 
Case No. 88-SN-9 
( , \l J 
v
-- i 
Julia C.~Whitfield 
Deputy /Clerk 
890366-CA 
1
 MR. ELLIS: Whatever you say is fair would have to be. 
2
 I THE COURT: Well, all right. As a final comment, I 
3
 have never, in all my years on the bench, spent as much time 
4
 considering the trial, the hearing and stayed awake at night 
5
 I wondering what would be appropriate here, because I do think that 
6 this matter got out of hand, it went beyond—it was a small matter 
7
 and it got blown into a big one. And I would hope that everybody 
8 involved in public law enforcement woufLd re-examine their 
9
 procedures and determine why the matter went that far. 
10 All right, 
11 MR. E L L I S : Thank y o u , y o u r H o n o r , 
12 THE COURT: C o u r t ' s a d j o u r n e d , 
13 J ( W h e r e u p o n , t h i s h e a r i n g was c o n c l u d e d . ) 
14 
15 
16 i * * * 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
COUNTY OF RICH 
SENTENCING DATE; May 23, 19 89 TIME: 
[ XX] STATE OF UTAH [ ] BRIGHAM CITY 
Plaintiff 
VS 
Reid Ellis 
Defendant 
) 
* 
) 
* 
) 
* 
) 
* 
) 
* 
AMENDED 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
PROBATION 
CASE #. 
ATTY: 
88-SM-9 
Tape No.. BC Digit Begin_ End 
Re: Order of Affirmance, from Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1990. 
The above named defendant having [ ]been adjudged guilty [ ]entered 
a guilty plea [ jentered a No Contest plea to the charge 
of Interfering with a Police Officer Class...A on 
Illegal Possession of alcohol Class B, Petty Theft Class 
IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT AS FOLLOWS: 
B 
JAIL 180 days, must serve 21 days. Balance of jail sentence to be 
suspended upon [ jSuccessful completion of probation [ jWork Project 
of hours [ ] Payment of fine 
FINE $ 350.00 [ ]victim Restitution $100 [ ]Victim Panel $50,00 
[ Jvictim Panel $ _ _ [ ]Drug Prevention Fee $150 
Bail Ordered: [ ]Forfeited [ ]Refunded 
[ ]Stay fine agreement signed Stay fine due on_ 
RESTITUTION [XX]Ordered to Old Rock Store ^Amount $ 6 4.19 
ALCOHOL: [ ]DUI School 
[ ]Private 
[ ]Mental Health Counseling. 
[ ]Review date 
[ ]Counseling_ mo •s or as directed 
_mo • s . [ jStay Judgment to_ 
The defendant is placed on probation to the [ ]APScP [ ] 
6 mos. during such time he/she shall abide by the 
PROBATION: 
Court for 
normal probation agreement and the Court retains jurisdiction to make 
further orders as it may deem necessary. 
To submit to random drug testing - **Jail time may be served in Utah 
County $T4T00 first day $24.00 each day thereafter. _ Defendants. 
has to apHl 16/ 1990 to arrance jail time and pay fine and~rest-.it.nHon. 
If defendant elects to serve jail time in Utah County the costs to Rich Count 
must be paid in advance of April 16, 1990-
Date y IJL 2£- M a-^-r-
Robert W, Daines, Judge 
PROBATION ENDS, Copies [ ]APP [ ]ALC 
[ ]BRMH [ ]WORK PROJECT 
[ ]BESO [ ]COMMITMENT 
ORDER 
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Richard Allen BRADSHAW, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14060. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Oct. 16, 1975. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth 
District Court, Beaver County, J. Harlan 
Burns, J., of intentionally interfering with 
a law enforcement official seeking to ef-
fect an arrest, and he appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Tuckctt, J., held that the stat-
ute under which defendant was convicted 
was unconstitutionally vague. 
Reversed and remanded for dismissal. 
Ilenriod, C. J., filed a concurring opin-
ion. 
Ellett and Crockett, JJ., dissented and 
filed separate opinions. 
C minal Law C=I3.I(2) 
;
 Statute making any person guilty of 
a misdemeanor when he "intentionally in-
terferes with a * * * law enforcement 
official seeking to effect an arrest or de-
tention of himself * * * regardless of 
whether there is a legal basis for the ar-
rest" may be subject to various meanings 
and interpretations, fails to inform ordi-
nary citizen who is seeking to obey the 
laws as to conduct sought to be proscribed, 
and therefore is unconstitutional as per-
mitting arrest without probable cause and 
without lawful basis. U.C.A.1953, 76-&-
305; Const, art. 1, § 14; U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 4. 
Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for de-
fendant-appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F. 
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
John O. Christiansen, Beaver County 
Atty., Beaver, for plaintiff-respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
After a trijil de novo in the district court, 
defendant w i^s found guilty of violating 
Sec. 76-8-3(|>5, U.C.A.1953, as amended, 
which reads ^s follows: 
A persori is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor when he intentionally interferes 
with a person recognized to be a law en-
forcement official seeking to effect an 
arrest or detention of himself or another 
regardless of whether there is a legal 
basis for t|ie arrest. 
The defendant was sentenced to serve six 
months in the county jail. From the ver-
dict and sentence the defendant has ap-
pealed claiming that the statute above re-
ferred to is invalid on constitutional 
grounds. 
The complainant is a policeman of Mil-
ford City, Braver County, Utah, who ob-
served the defendant driving an automobile 
on the streets of that city. The officer fol-
lowed the defendant to a service station 
where he informed the defendant that he 
was going to issue the defendant a citation 
for driving while his driver's license was 
suspended. After the defendant had com-
pleted the pijrchase of gasoline he drove 
away from tne service station a short dis-
tance to a hojel where he resided. The of-
ficer followed the defendant in a patrol 
car with the siren going. At the hotel, the 
officer infornled the defendant that he was 
under arrest for resisting arrest, at which 
time the officer pulled his revolver from 
the holster. The defendant tapped the of-
ficer on the chest and told the officer that 
he did not have the "guts" to shoot, where-
upon he left the scene and entered the 
hotel. At the service station where the of-
ficer first acposted the defendant, the of-
ficer did not ask the defendant to produce 
a driver's license. The accusation that the 
defendant was operating an automobile dur-
ing suspension was untrue, and the defend-
ant did in fact have a valid driver's license. 
It is doubtful whether or not the record 
supports the |conviction of the defendant 
inasmuch as the officer made no effort 
Aonendix iv 
STATE v. BRADSHAW 
Cite as 541 P.2d 800 
Utah 801 
to take custody of the defendant, and it is 
doubtful whether or not the act of the de-
fendant in simply ignoring the officer is 
an interference with him. On appeal we 
are only concerned, however, with the de-
fendant's challenge to the statute. In pass-
ing we point out that the officer accused 
the defendant of violation of the Motor 
Vehicle Code, and the provisions of that 
code should have been followed by the of-
ficer in dealing with the purported viola-
tion. The provisions of Sec. 41-6-166, U. 
C.A. 1953, are controlling in situations sim-
ilar to the one herein. A pertinent part 
of that section is as follows* 
Whenever any person is arrested for 
any violation of this act punishable as 
a misdemeanor, the arrested person shall 
be immediately taken before a magistrate 
within the county in which the offense 
charged is alleged to have been com-
mitted and who has jurisdiction of such 
offense and is nearest or most accessible 
with reference to the place where said 
arrest is made, in any of the following 
cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands 
an immediate appearance before a mag-
istrate. 
* * * * * * 
(4) In any other event when the per-
son arrested refuses to give his written 
promise to appear in court as hereinafter 
provided, or when in the discretion of the 
arresting officer, a written promise to 
appuir is insufficient. 
On appeal the defendant contends that 
the statute under which he was charged 
and convicted is invalid in view of the pro-
visions of Article I, Section 14, of the 
Utah Constitution, which reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no 
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1808, 
20 L.Ed.2d 889. 
2. Henry v. U. S.f 301 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 108, 
4 L.Ed.2d 134; Wong Sun v. U. #., 371 U.S. 
541 P^d—51 
warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
While the particular problem raised has 
not been before this court, the language 
of the Utah Constitution was taken verba-
tim from the language of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. The United States Su-
preme Court in dealing with the particular 
problem in the case of Terry v. Ohio,1 at 
page 16 of the U. S. Reports, SS S.Ct. at 
page 1877 had this to say: "It is quite plain 
that the Fourth Amendment covers 'sei-
zures' of the person which do not eventuate 
in a trip to the station house and prosecu-
tion for crime—'arrests' in traditional ter-
minology. It must be recognized that when-
ever a police officer accosts an individual 
and restrains his freedom to walk away, 
he has 'seized' that person." That case 
went on to hold that arrests without a war-
rant may only be made upon probable cause. 
Other decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court 
are to the same effect.2 
The language of the particular statute 
we are here dealing with is undoubtedly 
subject to the constitutional challenge of 
vagueness. That part of the statute "re-
gardless of whether there is a legal basis 
for the arrest" may be subject to various 
meanings and interpretations, li the in-
tention of the legislature was to penalize 
a law-abiding citizen by incarceration be-
cause he did not willingly submit to an un-
lawful arrest, a statute authorizing the 
same is in violation of both the Utah and 
United States Constitutions as above re-
ferred to in that it permits and authorizes 
an arrest without probable cause and with-
out lawful basis for the arrest. Likewise 
the word "interferes" as used in the stat-
ute without further definition or elabora-
471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Wright v. 
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 10 L. 
Ed.2d 349; People v. Curtis, 70 Cal.2d 347, 
74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 F.2d 33. 
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tion may mean any protest or verbal rcmon-
stration with an officer as well as the em-
ployment o{ phys\ca\ force to avoid an ar 
rest We are of the opinion that the lan-
guage of the statute as above pointed out 
fails to inform an ordinary citizen who is 
seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct 
sought to be proscribed The statute in the 
particulars above referred to is in violation 
of the Constitution of this State and the 
United States and therefore invalid. 
This matter is reversed and remanded to 
the district court to dismiss the complaint 
MAUGHAN, J , concurs 
HENRIOD, Chiet Justice (concurring) 
I concur, the while conceding that this 
may be a close case, and that the argu-
ments of the dissents about law and order 
and the integrity of the constabul iry, are 
peals of optimism for a desired socio pohti 
cal community Nonetheless, I am con-
Miiccd that they have neglected the liberty 
bell, whose chimes presumably reach the 
ears not only of the shacklcr but the shack 
lee, and presumably reflect each's constitu-
tional prerogative of equality,—the hall 
mark of which is reasonableness I take 
it that an> set of circumstances that out-
distances such sounds might be said to 
constitute a journey out of the realm of 
constitutionality as we understand it 
In this case the officer in the tirst in-
stance >aid he was going to issue the de 
fendant a citation for driving while his h 
cense was suspended He did not arrest 
him, or threaten him with an arrest Mil-
lions of citations are issued duly without 
an arrest The defendant did not object 
to a citation, nor did he resist an arrest at 
that time, but drove away a short distance 
followed by the officer, who arrested him, 
claiming he resisted arrest,—not borne out 
by the tacts 1 
I One of the dissents suggests that we must 
ignore the facts they being the function of 
the jurv Another suggestion seems apropos 
that without the facts, the unconstitutionality 
of a statute is a subject only of a declaratory 
The confrontation here was attended by 
the officer drawing his pistol,—necessary, 
perhaps, m a tekv\s\on scenano, but hard-
ly under the circumstances of this case. 
True it is, as the dissent urges, that the 
circumstances of a case may have nothing 
to do with the constitutionality of a statute, 
—but they may have everything to do with 
the question of unconstitutionality of a stat-
ute applicable to the facts and basic issue 
here They had a lot to do with Hitlensm, 
and in my opinion, the subject statute con-
c( ivably m iy] be knocking at the door of 
some such eventuality In such case I dif-
fer with my dissenting learned colleagues 
to the effect that the prevailing presump-
tion is in favor of constitutionality justify-
ing a six month stretch in jail In my book, 
where there is a statute that sanctions an 
arrest of a citi/en by a "recognized" law 
cnfoHcmcnt officer, popularly looked up 
on as a pcrspn in a blue, brass buttoned 
suit oruamcutled with a silver star over his 
heart (but who may be an mipostti in rent 
ed garb), which citizen is minding his own 
business, as hbre, where the non-interfer-
ence was non-Uolent but simply by driving 
away, "regardless of whether there is a 
legal basis for\the arrest or not, as was the 
case here, justf has to be unconstitutional 
In such case, iru picsumption in favor of 
constitutionality successfully is rebutted, 
and as genet ally is the rule, disappears, and 
the presumption of innocence that always 
attends a defendant, destroys the former, 
the latter to persist I acts well may be 
instrumental in its persistence 
The dissents J>ay there is no constitutional 
question here since there is no search 
and seizure problem involved. The mam 
opinion points to Ferry v Ohio2 and other 
authorities 3 that seem to disagree,—which 
authorities have my preference over such 
unsupported generality 
judgement that 
tutional right of 
ignores the fact of const! 
hbt rty. 
2 Footnote 1, mam opinion. 
3 Footnote 2, main opinion 
STATE v. I 
Cite ab 51 
I respectfully disagree with the gratuity 
in one of the dissents to the effect that 
"Nowhere in the statute can it be found 
that an unreasonable arrest is permittee! or 
encouraged." I suggest the subject statute 
both permits and encourages an unreason-
able—and I think unconstitutional—arrest 
when it says it is unlawful to interfere with 
a "law enforcement official/ '4 who tries 
to make an arrest "whether there is a legal 
basis for the arresty> or not. In other 
words, a peaceful citizen is forced by legis-
lation to become his own jail bait if he "in-
terferes" 5 with a law enforcement official 
making an arrest, no matter how outra-
geous, vicious or stupid it may be,—and if 
such citizen uses means that the statute 
seems by implication or legerdemain, to be 
an arbitrary exercise of poor judgment, 
but in doing so interferes with an officer, 
—it costs him six months deprivation of 
his liberty. 
Consider also, the ease where an over-
zealous, eager officer obviously is using 
excessive force to subdue a teenager to the 
point where bystanders honestly believe he 
is about to kill him, or where a drunken 
officer with a badge is arresting and beat-
ing a perfectly innocent citizen, or where 
a cop at a football stadium goes berserk 
and at the point of a gun attempts to ar-
rest everyone in front of him, or a game 
warden, in a remote wilderness area, out 
of sheer suspicion manhandles a hunter 
minding his own business, or an off-duty 
law enforcement officer in civilian clothes, 
but "recognized" as a Bobbie, tries to ar-
rest his neighbor on a trumped-up charge, 
—or this very case, where the officer ar-
rested an innocent person who had a valid 
license, who offered no interference what-
4. Which could he numbered in the dozens, such 
as sheriffs, deputies, eity policemen, town 
policemen, school crossing guards, const utiles, 
town marshals, judges of various hues, giune 
wardens, treasury agents, tax collectors, cam-
pus policemen, truant officers, forest rangers, 
justices of the peace, district court judges, 
Supreme Court Justices, sanitarians, agricul-
tural agents, special police, meter maids, t tc , 
ad infinitum. 
lEADSHAW Utah 803 
1 P.2d 800 
ever except to touch his fellow townsman, 
an officer, and actually walked away from 
an incident that the officer, not he, cre-
ated. 
The facts and hypothetics recited here 
are not for the purpose of deciding this 
case on the facts, which one of the dissents 
enoneously said we could do, but to dem-
onstrate the vagueness of the statute, and 
the door it opens ostensibly, on a pretext 
of false constitutionality, to events leading 
to an unconstitutional invasion of the con-
stitutional right against unreasonable sei-
zure, a guaranteed right of privacy and a 
constitutional assurance of right of free lo-
comotion and freedom from harassment and 
incarceration,—all in virtue of a statute 
that presents a ridiculous discrimination in 
favor of a law enforcement official and 
against an erstwhile law-abiding citizen 
who becomes a jailbird at the expense of 
the mistaken, and what is worse, the illegal 
act of an arresting" official. To me this 
adds up to an Eleventh Commandment, to 
go hence and defy the law hiding behind 
a badge, and let him who is without sin, 
but interferes in the lawlessness, to serve 
the sentence. 
It seems to me to be somewhat of a de-
parture from reality and practicality and 
even morality to say a statute is constitu-
tional that says one person can violate the 
law and by virtue of such illegal act induce 
another to indulge in a confrontation which 
he did not seek and get six months because 
a possible tormenter, acting illegally, goad-
ed him into it. It is a rather superficial 
answer to say, as do the dissenters here, 
that having perhaps unwittingly "inter-
fered" in an arrest, with the sometimes 
ludicrous and chameleonic meaning that 
5. "Interferes" carries with it a multiple con-
notation so vague as to render a statute un-
constitutional, in my opinion. Does one inter-
fere with an officer if he heckles him, refuses 
to leave the scene of a demonstration in which 
a person is being arrested, is a curiosity 
seeker at a fire where a suspected arsonist is 
being apprehended, a physician attempting to 
administer to a dying man who is being ar-
rested, etc.? 
Utah Rep 533-542 P 2d—27 
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someone "might" attach to the word, the 
"interferer," acting- in good faith, not hav-
ing read this funny statute, should be con-
tent to lose his job, his good name in the 
community, his liberty for six months, and 
his respect for the establishment, in ex-
change for the great privilege of hiring a 
lawyer, going to court to seek damages 
(which are no substitute for loss of free-
dom),—all because one of the countless 
hordes of law enforcement officials not on-
ly committed a pediculous, but illegal rip-off 
in making what is worse, the arrest of a 
person who at common law had a perfect 
right to resist, and who, but for this pa-
ternalistic, autocratic legislation in a free 
society, could resist arrest, and who as of 
now, can resist arrest if it happens to be 
classified as a citizen's arrest. 
This statute does not have any semblance 
of a reasonable, constitutional statute pre-
faced by a warning requirement of some 
kind, a reasonable request that the citizen 
show something, or that under the circum-
stances "probable cause" appears to justify 
an arrest, or "that there is reason to be-
lieve an offense has been or is about to 
be committed." 
One of the dissents asserts that it ap-
pears that the majority "is influenced by 
the facts of the case and seeks an impermis-
sible way to correct what it considers a 
bad verdict." Although this statement may 
be permissible gratuity as to others in the 
majority triumvirate, it is not so as to this 
author, since he was influenced by the pro-
visions of the statute as being a constitu-
tionally impermissible way to correct what 
I consider to be a bad and vague treatment 
of a citizen's constitutional right. 
One of the dissents suggests that "The 
main opinion is at some pains to explain 
how the police officer could have handled 
this apparently arrogant and belligerent 
defendant in a different manner." It does 
not tak^ much imagination to answer that 
question. The officer easily could have 
6. Two Other eases cited in the dissent, ROSCIP-
berg v. State, and State v. Byrne, are Florida 
cases decided in Appellate Division Courts, in-
ferior courts not having the authoritative 
checked with the MJotor Vehicle Depart-
ment, to determine if his fellow townsman 
had a valid license, in which event he would 
have found that he aid have such license. 
Or he calmly could have handed a citation 
to defendant or placed it on his car, or left 
it at his home, or mailed it to him. It is 
suggested that the dissent "is at some pains" 
to explain why the officer did not do one 
of the things mentioned above, or why 
impetuous, unreasonable police officer 
threatened the defendant by drawing his 
gun, and why he committed a breach of 
the peace in the process of what proved to 
be an unlawful arrest,—an act the pre-
vention of which the dissents both say was 
the very purpose of he statute they say is 
salutary in keeping the peace. 
In passing, it is noted that neither of the 
dissents cites any authority that really sup-
ports the rule provided in the statute here. 
One, Miller v. Statei, a 1969 Alaska case 
(462 P.2d 421), at f rst blush would seem 
to. It may be pointed out, however, that 
the court there laid down a rule of law 
having no codification, which was similar 
to the provisions of our statute, saying that 
at least one state court had recommended 
such a rule as a matter of its common law 
development, being State v. Koonce, 89 
N.J.Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428, 1965,—an in-
termediate court but not the court of last 
resort, the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
However, the Miller case, supra, pulled 
its punches on any constitutionality ques-
tion, which was not even raised in the case, 
when it said "It should be noted that the 
rule we formulate today has no application 
when the arrestee apprehends bodily in-
jury, or when an unlawful arrest is attempt-
ed by one not known to be a peace officer. 
Quite different problems are then present." 
On the strength of such hedging, it is sug-
gested that this case the only one cited in 
the dissent, certainly would be undispositivc 
in an attack on a statute's constitutionality 
on the ground of vagueness.6 
weight of the Florid^ Supreme Court, having 
the same subordinate stature of State v. 
Koonce, supra. 
STATE v. BRADSHAW 
Cite as 541 P.2d 800 
T am of the opinion the statute cannot ant is entitled 
stand a true test of constitutionality based 
either on a claim of 1) vagueness or 2) un-
reasonable seizure. 
Utah 805 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
I can agree that there was no basis for 
an arrest, but cannot agree that the statute 
is contrary to the provision of our constitu-
tion. It does not permit an unlawful seiz-
ure (arrest). It merely transfers the right 
of redress for a wrongful arrest to the or-
derly procedure of a court trial instead of 
a brawl in the streets.1 
The question of lawfulness of an arrest 
may be a close one, and a brawl may result 
in a killing. The legislature was wise in 
passing the statute in question in the in-
terest of maintaining order and preventing 
confrontations which might lead to blood-
shed. Nowhere in the statute can it be 
found that an unreasonable seizure (ar-
rest) is permitted or encouraged. There is 
no change in the law that one making an 
unlawful arrest must answer for it, and 
so there is no basis for saying the statute 
conflicts with the Constitution. 
The common law gave a person the right 
to resist an unlawful arrest, but times have 
changed since the time when self-help was 
permitted to prevent a wrongful arrest. 
At common law, arrests were often made 
by citizens. Judges were not available for 
speedy release on bond, and trials were long 
delayed. Such conditions no longer exist. 
An arrested person must be taken forth-
with before a magistrate, and trials must 
.not be unreasonably delayed.2 A defend-
1. Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska 
1969); Rosenberg v. State, 264 So.2d 68; 
State v. Byrne, 311 So.2d 764; See Annota-
tion in 44 A.L.R. 3rd at p. 1087 for cases 
holding it a crime to resist a known officer 
when making an arrest even absent a statute 
like ours. 
2. Art. I, Sec, 12, Utah Const. 
3. Art. I, Sec. 9, Utah Const. 
4. Art. VIII, Sec. 9, Utah Const. 
5. Sec. 78-3-5, U.C.A.1953. 
titl  to bail in a reasonable 
amount.3 Besides the statute does not pre-
vent resistance to an unlawful arrest when 
made by a private person. It only applies 
to arrests made by a known police officer. 
By both our constitution4 and statute,6 
the ruling of the district court in cases ap-
pealed from a justice of the peace court is 
final except as to cases involving the con-
stitutionality of a statute.6 This matter is 
such a case, and so we must limit our re-
view to the determination of whether the 
statute is invalid. We may not review the 
facts of the case. 
It appears that the prevailing opinion is 
influenced by the facts of the case and 
seeks an impermissible way to correct what 
it considers a bad verdict. 
That is the function of the trial court— 
not that of an appellate tribunal. If we 
wish to be jurors, we should renounce our 
position as justices and wait until our 
names are drawn for jury service. 
In reviewing a statute to ascertain its 
constitutionality, certain rules of construc-
tion must be applied: 
(a) A legislative enactment is presumed 
to be valid and in conformity with the con-
stitution.7 
(b) It should not be held to be invalid un-
less it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
to be incompatible with some particular 
constitutional provision.8 
(c) The burden of showing invalidity 
of an ordinance or statute is upon the one 
who makes the challenge.9 
6. Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 48 P. 
41, affd. 173 U.S. 32, 19 S.Ct. 317, 43 L.Ed. 
603 (1897) ; State v. Iloltgreve, 58 Utah 563, 
200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 696 (1921) ; American 
Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 
249 (1930). 
7. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 
Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968) ; 
Snow v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 
234 (1948). 
8. Cases cited note 1 supra. 
9. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 
Inc., supra note 7. 
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In the case of State v. Packard10 it was 
said: 
It is recognized that statutes should not 
be declared unconstitutional if there is 
any reasonable basis upon which they may 
be sustained as falling within the con-
stitutional framework [citations omit-
ted], and that a statute will not be held 
void for uncertainty if any sort of sensi-
ble, practical effect may be given it. 
[Citations omitted]. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
in Roth v. U. S.11 said: 
. . . This Court, however, has con-
sistently held that lack of precision is 
not itself offensive to the requirement 
of due process. " . . . [T]he Con-
stitution does not require impossible 
standards"; all that is required is that 
the language "conveys sufficiently defi-
nite warning as to the proscribed conduct 
when measured by common understand-
ing and practices . . . " United 
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S. 
Ct. 1538,91 L E A 1877. 
The case of Sunset Amusement Co. v. 
Board of Police Commissioners of City of 
Los Angeles12 is in point: 
It should be kept in mind 
that there are an infinite variety of ac-
tivities or conduct which could result in 
potential or actual danger to the "peace, 
health, safety, convenience, good morals, 
and general welfare" of the public. A 
municipality cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to isolate and specify those precise 
activities or conduct which are intended 
to be proscribed. As stated in Daniel 
[Daniel v. Board of Police Com'rs, 190 
Cal.App.2d 566, 12 Cal.Rptr. 226] quoting 
from an earlier case, "To make a statute 
sufficiently certain to comply with con-
10. 122 Utah 309, 373, 250 P.2d 561, 563 
(1952). 
stitutional requirements [of due process 
of law] it is not necessary that it fur-
nishes detailed plans and specifications 
of the acts or conduct prohibited." 
The author 
parently doubts 
constitutional 
sonable seizures 
lant. He seems 
the constitutional 
This claim 
opinion, and] 
or on appea 
I can see 
guage of thej 
of the prevailing opinion ap-
that the statute violates the 
provision regarding unrea-
as claimed by the appel-
to buttress the decision on 
challenge of vagueness. 
personal to the author of the 
was not raised either at trial 
nothing vague about the lan-
statute in question. Any per-
son of ordinary intelligence should know 
that when a known officer is making, or 
attempting to make, an arrest, self-help or 
lay interference is prohibited by the law. 
In my opinion the statute is not uncon-
stitutional, and we are duty bound to so 
say and to affirm the judgment. 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting). 
With due respect to our disagreeing col-
leagues, I arti impelled to state that the ma-
jority opinion impresses me as a strained 
effort to cast the statute in a light different 
from its t rui intent and meaning for the 
purpose of making it appear to be uncon-
stitutional and striking it down. It is my 
judgment that such a ruling is contrary to 
sound principles of law and considerations 
of policy. In addition to the cogent and 
correct observations of Justice Ellett, in-
cluding: that a legislative enactment should 
not be so nullified unless it is violative of 
some constitutional provision beyond a rea-
sonable doubj, I offer some further com-
ments. 
First, I re 
12. 7 Cal.3d 
P.2d 840, 843 
-emphasize that this statute 
does not authorize a peace officer to make 
£4, 101 Cal.Rptr. 
(1972). 
768, 773, 496 
\\y 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312 
lL.Ed.2dl498 (1956). 
an unlawful arrest 
the seizure of any person or property. It 
does not deal with when or under what cir-
cumstances the lawful arrest may be made. 
That subject is dealt with elsewhere in the 
law.1 Neither does it in any way adverse-
ly affect oi deprive any person who is sub-
jected to an improper or unlawful arrest 
of any right or remedy he has always had 
under the law. It seems inescapably plain 
to me that the sole purpose of this statute 
is to safeguard against interference with a 
peace officer who is attempting to make 
an arrest, to the end that violence may be 
avoided. 
This statute may be different than you 
or I, or the other justices of this court may 
desire it to be, or would have drafted it, 
had that been their responsibility. But I 
certainly do not think it is beyond the realm 
oi ratwnahty to see it as the expressed wi)) 
of the people of this State, acting through 
their legislature, that when any duly au-
thorized peace officer is -attempting to 
make an arrest, no citizen should interfere 
with him. If the arrest proves to be im-
proper or unlawful, whoever is aggrieved 
thereby is not without the remedies the law 
gives him, both in that case if it comes to 
court, and/or in another if he wants to sue. 
All this statute does is to make it a mis-
demeanor if he presumes to judge the law-
fulness of the arrest, and interferes with 
the officer in the performance of his duty. 
STATE v. BRADSHA^ 
Cite as 541 P.2d 800 
Nor does it authorize by the constitution.2 
Utah 807 
It therefore has the 
power to |enact any law or regulation cal-
culated to preserve the peace and good or-
der of the citizenry, unless some constitu-
tional provision prohibits it. 
The provision of our Constitution quoted 
and relied on as nullifying the statute is 
Section 14, Article I, relating to searches 
and seizures. It is submitted that if that 
section is considered in its total context, 
as rules 6f construction require, it will be 
seen that the purpose of that section is in 
accordance with its title "Unreasonable 
searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant"; 
and that it is dealing with the invasion of 
privacy by unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures of persons, houses, papers and effects 
and when the issuance of a warrant is 
necessary for that purpose, and not with 
the matter of making an arrest of the na-
ture involved here. I therefore do not see 
how that constitutional provision can prop-
erly be regarded as preventing the legisla-
ture from enacting a peace and good order 
statute such as the one in question, nor 
how it has any application to the situation 
dealt with in this case. 
We should look at the composite of this 
fact situation in a light supportive of the 
jury verdict, approved by the trial court 
in his denial of motion to set it aside. But, 
let it pe conceded that the police officer 
may hak/e been mistaken concerning the de-
fendant's having a revoked driver's license. 
The miin opinion is at some pains to ex-
In considering whether it is within the
 p , a i n ji w t h e p o H c e o f f k e r c o u , d h a v e 
power of the state legislature to enact such 
a statute it is important to have in mind 
that, as contrasted to the federal govern-
ment, which has only those powers express-
ly granted to it, the legislature of this State 
has all of the powers of sovereignty, ex-
cept only as expressly limited or prohibited 
I. See Title 77, Ch. 13, Utah Code Ann.1953. 
handled this apparently arrogant and in-
solent defendant in a different manner. It 
wholly ignores the proposition that if this 
defendant had not been a person oi that 
disposition, and if he had a valid driver's 
license; on him as the law requires, he could 
359, 
citedj 
374 P.2d 516, and authorities therein 
2. To avoid repetition on this subject here, 
see statement in Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 
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have avoided any difficulty for himself 
or the police officer by simply so stating 
and exhibiting the license. But he chose 
the contrary course which resulted in the 
difficulty in which he finds himself. 
1 cannot see it as consistent with my ju-
dicial duty in the light of what I regard 
as correct principles of law and sound policy 
to align myself with the position of this 
defendant who obviously manifests a dis-
position to flout the law and authority, and 
place the burden of exemplary behavior 
on the peace officer who is trying to en-
force and uphold it. It is my impression 
that, quite different from the view taken 
by the jurors and the trial judge, the pos-
sibility exists that some members of the 
court may view the fact situation in this 
case as offensive to their sense of justice. 
If this be so, and the ends of justice re-
quire overturning the verdict, this court 
could very well do so by deciding that the 
peace officer was wrong and that ^there 
was no justification for finding that the 
defendant was ''interfering" with the peace 
officer making an arrest. I could not agree 
with that solution, believing that to be the 
prerogative of the jury and the trial court. 
But in my judgment that would be a solu-
tion more nearly rational and in conformity 
with proper judicial function and preroga-
tive than to strike the statute down to rec-
tify one seemingly harsh case. This would 
also be in harmony with the well-estab-
lished principle of constitutional law: that 
the court should not declare a statute un-
constitutional if the case can be decided on 
other grounds.3 
In any event, it should be indicated that 
it is unconstitutional only as applied when 
a person resists arrest as to himself or his 
family, and not remove its effect from oth-
er situations where its salutary purpose 
should be preserved. 
The STATE df Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
Lewis A. BAN^KS, Jr., Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Noj 13996. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct] 2, 1975. 
Defendant wafc convicted after trial by 
jury in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Gordon M. Hall, J., of aggravated 
assault. Defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court held Ithat it was not error to 
admit into evidence a pistol which had 
been seized in close! proximity to where de-
fendant was arrester! and which was suffi-
ciently similar to the gun used that gun ad-
mitted into evidence could serve for illus-
trative purposes. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law C^4(k(4) 
In prosecution wherein defendant was 
convicted of aggravated assault, it was not 
error to admit into eWidence pistol which 
had been seized in 1 close proximity to 
where defendant was larrested and which 
was sufficiently similar to gun used that 
gun admitted into evidence could serve for 
illustrative purposes. 1U.CA.1953, 76-5-
102(1) (c), 76-5-103(1) (b), (2). 
2. Searches and Seizures p=>3.3(5) 
Where gun was found in close prox-
imity to where defendant was arrested, of-
ficers had right to takje it for their own 
protection. 
Jack W. Kunkler, Salt Lake Legal De-
fender Assn., Salt Lakf City for defendant 
and appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, VVtty. Gen., Earl F. 
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City 
for plaintiff and respondent 
3. See Heathman v. Giles, 18 Utah 2d 368, 37 i P.2d 839; 16 Am.Jur.2d 301. 
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per had obtained a copy of the petition, 
Including the first and final accounting 
aftd had taken it to his legal counsel in Salt 
Lake City prior to the October 7, 19ol, 
hearing. Appellants did not need to (west 
the ehtire 233-pa^e document prior to the 
hearing to enabL them to object./Pages 
one ana two are a summary of the Account-
ing in h^e form recommended by/the pro-
bate division. The amount of the/assets on 
hand for^ distribution is unambiguously 
written on 'bottom line" of jthe summa-
ry. This fact alone, in light of appellants' 
allegations di Zions' earlier representations 
regarding th^ value of the estate, should 
have sufficiently alerted them that some-
thing might be\awry and caused them to 
appear at the hearing. If appellants did 
not agree with the amount/ shown on the 
summary, they ha i more than ample time 
to appear at the hearing apd lodge an ob-
jection or ask for a \jontinuance to study 
the document. Contiiiuances of this type 
are given as a matter^f course by the 
court in probate proceedings. Additionally, 
appellants had three months in which they 
could have moved for relief under Rule 
60(b)(1) to (4). We acknowledge that the 
granting of a continuance^ discretionary 
with the trial court and that "[t]he right of 
a citizen to due process of\law must rest 
upon a basis more substantial than favor or 
discretion." Roller v. Holly,\m U.S. 398, 
20 S.Ct. 410, 44 L.Ed. 520 (1900). In 
Roller, the United States Supreme Court 
set aside an 1891 default judgment on due 
process grounds, holding that five days' 
notice to Roller, a Virginia resident, to ap-
pear in a Texas court was insufficient to 
allow Roller to travel to Texas, hire an 
attorney, and prepare his case. However, 
in these days of efficient rapid trVnsporta-
tion and relatively inexpensive telecommu-
nications, we are less willing to allow dis-
tance alone to weigh heavily on oui^  review 
of the adeouacy of the notice. Here, Phil-
lip C. Pepper had discussed Zions' petition 
with legal counsel in Salt Lake City prior to 
the hearing, but neither he nor his counsel 
appeared at the hearing to register^ any 
objection. Under these facts, appellants 
were not denied due process of law. Pur-* 
^ther, almost nine months Expired before 
Appellants raised their claim of lack of due 
process. Because Rule 60(b)(7) requires 
such a claim to be made wiihin a "reasoc 
able\ime," the trial court did not abus^ 
discretion in refusing to set \ 
ber 8, l\)81, order. 
Appellants also assert that notice to their 
mother, Fannie N. Pepper, 
because sheVwas legally in^) 
Zions was awiare of that. 
C. Pepper was\^  appointed 
his mother by an Arizona 
no motion to join Jbis mdxherj 
Nor is she a party\ to/this appeal. Hence, 
we do not considerywheth^r her due pro-
cess rights were violated. 
We hold that line W r t i 
denying appellants' peti\ 
Zions' motion 
to respondent 
aside the/ 
^va^ inadequate 
petent, and 
though Phillip 
cjonservator for 
pourt, he made 
in the petition. 
did not err in 
aon land in granting 
dismissA Affirmed. Costs 
HALL, OfJ., STEWART 
JJ., and /T)EAN E. CO! 
Judge, cofncur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does 
hereii/ CONDER, District 
id DURHAM, 
CR, District 
not Vparticipate 
|Judg$, sat 
( O S KEY NUMBER SYST£M> 
STATE of Utah, Plsjintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Gillis HYGH, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 19402J 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 16, 19?5. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake bounty, Homer F. 
Wilkinson, J., of aggravated robbery, and 
he appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
C.J., held that: (1) inventory search of de-
Appencjix v . 
STATE v. HYGH Utah 2 6 5 
Cttca»7il P-2d2M (Vi*h 1985) 
fendant's vehicle was not proper since it sonable searches cannot be evaded by label-^jssas^ 
in& them, "inventory" searches. Cons t -JP 
A r t 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. C o n s t A m e n d . 4 . ^ 
izure^ c 
was pretextual and not conducted accord-
ing to proper procedures, and (2) trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in limiting 
cross-examination of service station attend-
ant who was robbed by limiting question-
ing concerning the exact method of activa-
tion of surveillance camera during robbery. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Zimmerman, J., concurred and filed 
opinion in which Durham, J., concurred. 
5. Searches and Se c=>3.3(6) 
In order that an inventor}' search of a 
vehicle be lawful, there must have been 
reasonable and proper justification for the 
vehicle's impoundment, either through ex-
plicit statutory authorization or through 
circumstances surrounding the initial stop. 
Const A r t 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 
C 
1. Arrest <•>?!.1(1) 
Searches and Seizures C=3.3(4, 7) 
In order for a search to be constitu-
tionally permissible, a^se^xci^ warrant" is- ** 
sued by neutral magistrate and based upon 
probable cause is required un less search is 
within an exception to the warran t require-
ment such as;,
 :limited search ir.ru*ent to 
lawful arrest, search of an automobile 
based on probable cause, , that it contains 
^-contraband, or seizure^of evidence in plain 
6. Searches and Seizures *^=»7(29) 
^ I t is the s tate 's burden to establish 
necessity for taking an inventory,of a ve-
hicle. Cons t A r t 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 4. 
view by one with a lawful rigKt to be in a c o r 9ia " l J l I 0 1 J 0 " P r e s c n t ^ 
position to 'WoUtrvPiC^TcZ^^ % that^ officer did' n o t involve owner of ve-
§ 14; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
2. Searches and Seizures 0=>3.3(6) 
7. Searches and Seizures C=>3.3(6) 
Search of automobile was not a valid 
inventory search, since it appeared to be a 
j ire text for a warrantless search and offi-
e  did not follow prescribed procedures in 
that officer d i d ' n o t involve o ner of ve-
hicle, who_was prr >ont, in his decision yb 
f conduc t search, rather than permitting j& 
owner to make otht r mspo.siuon of vehicle, 
An inventon-search constitutes an ex- \4)ff1C€r did not completely search the ve-
ception to the warrant requirement* a war-
rantless search of an impounded vehicle for 
purposes of protecting police and public 
from danger, avoiding police liability for 
lost or stolen property and protecting own-
er's property is permitted by the State and 
Federal Constitutions. Const Art. 1, § 14; 
U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 4. 
3. Criminal Law C=a94.4<3) 
Searches find Seizures C=\3.3(l) 
Contraband or other evidence of crime 
discovered in a true inwntory search may 
be seized without a warrant and introduced 
into evidence at trial. C n s t A r t 1, § 14; 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures 0 3 . 3 ( 1 ) 
I n ven toryj-i.'a reh ,txc*.j*tion to the war-
rant requirement d*«tc r.M a;^)y uhen the ra t 
inventory t* merely a pre!* \ t f^r 
invt negatory pohce m o u r e r *« 
cor^ ttutAr.at "^'..aranu^*> 
rhiclc or make list of it cm ^ found, and offi-
ce! had sent another officer to retrieve 
photo of robbery su.-pect even before ask-
ing defendant for his lire rise and registra-
tion, waited for photo before beginning 
search, and searched vuth picture in hand. 
Const A r t 1, § 14; U.S.C.A. Const Arnmd. 
4. 
8. Criminal t a w e-0f>2.7 
Right to confrontation includes right to 
cros>-< -xamine witnesses; however, this 
right is not absolute, as trial court has 
discretion in limiting scope and extent of 
cross-examination which will not be re-
u s e d on review absent an abuse. U.S. 
CA. Const.Amend. 6. 
9. Criminal Lau C-GG2.7 
:i!r»p no 
^amt-tal 
,\ga*ns! trrrea-
— , > 
not fKCjr ur.!' 
nation r<v:ld 
limitation on cro«-s exami-
.. on.ibly be exfu-rted to 
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have a substantial effect on jury's decision, surveillance camera that had been installed 
U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 6. by the Salt Lake City Police Department 
10. Witnesses <s=>271(l) tixe F ^ ™ u s month. After the robber left, 
T\_- i -* J - J * v «* J- *- the clerk called the police. The police had 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion .
 % . x , | / A, . . r , 
. ,. ... ,
 t , ., . t . , also be^n alerted to the robbery by an 
in limiting defendant s cross -ex am ma bo n of . L ,. , ,
 ec. service station clerk to preclude question-
ing as to exact method he used to activate 
surveillance camera during robbery*, for 
purpose of authenticating photos of sus-
pect, since testimony as to how camera was 
activated could not reasonably be expected 
to have had a substantial effect on jury 's 
decision in light of clerk's testimony that 
photographs depicted man who robbed the 
station in the act, his personal identification 
of defendant as the man in photo, and 
foundational testimony authenticating the 
photographs. U S.C.A. Const-Amend. 6. 
Edward Brass, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., J. Ste-
phen Mikita, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and respondent 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Gillis Hygh appeals a convic-
tion of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony. U.C.A., 19f>3, § 76-6-302 (1978). 
alarm in the police dispatcher's office 
which went off when the surveillance cam-
era was activated. The police arrived 
shortly thereafter. The film from the sur-
veillance camera wlas unloaded by a detec-
tive and taken for developing. Several of 
the developed pictures showing the rob-
ber 's face and clothing were posted at city 
police stations on the line-up boards. 
Immediately after the robbery, the clerk 
identified the robber to police as a black 
man wearing a rust or red colored ski mask 
on his head but not over his face. The 
robber was also wearing a khaki colored 
coat with "furry" lining and with a rip over 
the left pocket The surveillance camera 
pictures showed this description to be accu-
rate. 
On January 6, 1983, a Salt Lake City 
police officer, Officer Foster, after 
stopping for a traffic light in the left lane 
next to defendant's car, noticed an expired 
rejected safety inspection s t icker ! on de-
fendant's lower left front windshield. Offi-
cer Foster also noticed that the driver re-
Deft ndant alleges that the warrantless **in- ' semb!cd the individual in the photograph of 
ventory search" of his autc mobile after he 
was placed under custodial arrest was un-
lawful. We agree. 
At about 10 00 p.m. on Dtcember 31, 
1982, a man entered a s e n ice station in 
Salt Lake Cit\ and a^ked for a pack of 
cigarettes. As the clerk handed the cus-
tomer the cigarettes, the customer pulled 
a 22 caliber revolver from under his coat 
and ordered the clerk to empty the cash 
register. The clerk did so, putting approxi-
mately ?350 into a paper bag. As he was 
emptying the register, the clerk activated a 
I. A rejected inspection sticker is placed on a 
\rhicle if the \chicle docs not paw the annua! 
safct) inspection. The ouncr of the vehicle 
then has five da\\ to complete repair* and brin$ 
the vehicle back to be remspccled. 
L At the pretrial suppression hearing. Officer 
Poster testified The reason I vtopped him was 
the robl»ery suspect! posted at the police 
station. The officer testified at the hear-
ing la suppress the evidence taken from 
defendant's car that he stopped defendant's 
car l^cause of the expired safety inspec-
tion sticker.1 
After stopping defendant's car, Foster 
sent a second officer to the police station to 
get the posted photo 
}K*CL Foster then 
of the robbery sus-
bhecked defendant's 
driver's license and registration. The car 
was registered to defe ndant, but defendant 
had no driver's license with him. A radio 
because of the inspection sticker." At trial. Offi-
cer Foster was asked this question: "Was the 
ranirclaj reason that you stopped the Defend-
ant** vehicle, did it have [anything to do with any 
photos that jou had seen earlier that da) at the 
police nation"*" He replied: "That uas the rca-
von. \rk" 
M A I L v. u iOM uian ^ / 
call to t* t police dispatcher verified that nltd b) the trial court on the basis that the 
defendant nad a license, but also revealed search was a proper inventory search. At 
two outstanding misdemeanor arrest war- a trial before a jury, defendant was convict-
rants against defendant Officer Foster eel of aggravated robbery. Defendant ap-
placed defendant under arrest on the basis peals, seeking a reversal of that conviction 
of those warrants, handcuffed him, and put and a new trial. 
him in the patrol car. m r A r t i c l e X s^ctipV 14 "of " th^Uta^ 
Foster then ascertained that defendant's State* Constitution, and the fourth amend^ 
passenger was not a licensed driver and mer.t to the United States Constitution pro-
called for an impound wrveker to tow the fcijjjt uniV^sonable searches and seizures, 
car away. ^ J J I order-for a search to be constitutionally 
After the second officer returned with ^permissible, a search warrant issued by a 
the photo, Officer Foster conducted a V.c-tral magistral and based upon proba-
search of defendant's car with the photo in ; M* c a u s e * ^ " ^ .There are, however,5 
his hand.3 Re did not use an imentory V****^ exceptions to the warrant require-
sheet and did not make a list of the items ™nL These include afKmiied search inci-
found in the car.4 In the trunk, the officer f*ent t0 a ! a w f u l arrest; \ , search or an 
found sexeral jackets, a cap, several shirts, *?Utfiiaobne based on probable cause that ft 
and a ski mask lying over the spare tire f contains contraband,; and seizure of e\> 
The officer also found an unripped plastic,, ** n c e Jn P ' a ! n v I e w b * o n ? w i t h * hwfnl 
gjm hag. The officer looked inside theC r ^ h l t 0 b e i n a P o s i t i o n to s o o b s e r v e ^ 
bag and found a .22 caliber revolver. The [2] It is also v.ell established that an 
gas station clerk later identified the ski inventory search constitutes an exception 
mask, one of the jackets, and the gun as to the warrant requirement8 A warraVif-
those used by the robber. The clerk also less search of an impounded vehicle for the 
identified defendant as the robber. After / pu rp l e s of protecting the police and public 
the ee'reh of the car, Officer Foster trans- fronTclanger* avoiding police liability for 
ported defendant to the police station. Of- . lost t>r stolen propeitv, and pruUcfing the 
fieer Foster informed the robber)' detective owner's ^>]n»rt]TTsj)errrutted by the fourth 
that he belie\ed defendant was the robber amendment and article I, section 14 of the 
of the sen ice station. The detective ques- UtahJ>Ute Constitution.1 
tioned defendant, then ordered Officer Fos~
 ( 3 4 ] Became in\enterics promote such 
ter to place defendant under arrest for
 i r r < p o r t r i n t interests and are not investigate-
aggravated robbery'. ,-y in pur ine , they do not implicate "the 
At a pretrial kuppncsion hearing, de- interests which are protected when 
ftndant c^ktd to have the clothing items searches are conditioned on warrants."10 
and the revolver taken from the car sup- Therefore, inventory searches are not per 
preyed LS being the result of a pr* !<\tual, se unn a^onable within the meaning of the 
warrantless starch. The motion was de- fojrth amendment and article I, section 14 
3. Tt c rev >rd indie a cs lhat Foster scanhed onl\ !L 5- *th tXzicta % Oppirman, 428 US 364, 96 
the in nV of tlie \chicle S Ci 3092. 49 1.1 d 2d 1000 (1976), State \ Cole, 
k x t ItAh. 674 P2d 119, 126 (1983) 
4. At the p etna! suppression hearjn£ Foster u a s 
*>sled When \ou impound a car. Offuer. do _ 
* . r i >•>- it 9. Chpirtrzn. supra note 8, State \ Romero, 
\ou u'vc jn imcntorv sheet of v~nc kind1 He '/ '
 v ^ ^ . 
"rephed ^o . 1 don't". I W . a l M doni.- l ' * h n* V 2 d 6 " <1 9 8 I>' St*'< V Crahtrce' 
l u \ 616 P2d 484. 485 (1980). 
5. Chime! v California. 395 U S 752, f9 S Q 
2034, 23 LFd 2d 685 (19*9). IQ, Otp,rr^n^ 428 US at ^52-83. 96 S Ct. at 6 O.jnhers i Kiaroney. 399 US 42, 90 S Ct 
1975. 26 L.Ld2d 419 (1970). 
7. CmAJgc v Sew Hampshire. 403 US 443. 91 
SCi 2022. 29 LLd 2d 564 (1971). 
3103-04. 49 LFd 2d 1000 (Pour!!, J . concur-
ring) 
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Contraband or other evidence of crime dis-
covered in a true inventory search may be 
seized without a warrant and introduced 
into evidence at trial.1 J~ However, the in-, 
Xentory ..exception does not apply %*hen the 
-..inventory U rarely "a pretext concealing 
unjnvestigatory police rnoiive/;1!^ Funda*? 
^mentalconstitutions] guarantees against 
'- auifcaso::able searches canno: be evaded h> 
labeling""them "Inventory" searches.1! 
[5] In order to support a finding that a 
valid inventory search has taken place, the 
court must first determine whether there 
was reasonable and proper justification for 
the impoundment of the vehicle.15 This 
justification, and thus lawful impoundment, 
can be had either through explicit statutory 
authorization or* bv the circumstances sur-
rounding the initial stop.14 f i r impound-J 
ment was nekherwaulIio*ni:e3'nor necessary, 
the "starch was unreasonable,1^] 
(Hah's statutes give a police department 
authority to impound vehicles in several 
situations. Vehicles may lawfully be im-
pounded when they are used to transport 
controlled substances, U.C.A., 1953, § 5&-
37-13; when the vehicle is improjn?rly reg-
istered or stolen, U.C.A., 1953, § 41-1-115; 
or when a vehicle is abandoned, U.C.A., 
1953, § 41-6-116.10. #No spKSrific statutory' 
authority exists authorizing "'Impound of a 
vehicle stopped and parked on the street 
after the driver has been arrested. There-
11. See, e.g., Hams v. I'r.iird S:a:es. 3^0 VS. 234, 
88 S C i . 992. 19 LFd-2d 1067 U c6$>; Fee.se v. 
Commonwealth. 220 \"a. 1035. 1039, 265 S F 2d 
746, 749 (19S0). 
12. Oppcrman. 425 l /S at 376. 95 S O at 3100 
13. State v. MeDzniel 156 N J .Super. 347. 354-
55, 3S3 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1975). Sse cUo Annot., 
Lawfulness of "1 memory Search" of Motor Ve-
hiclc Impounded b> Police. 45 A L R.3J 537. 544 
(1973): 
Another &u><.;tU*i f ;c;c^^:v;c lo a valid in-, 
ventory srarch is that the pohc* must have* 
taken lawful cusioiy of t>*c vehicle in the firjH 
irntame. It hkT thcrcfare been held tfiat 
uficrc l h c \ ircilrrA'.ir.*ri sh?*A that the p^ficc 
l>isd no authority to irr.p^ur.d the \ehicle, or 
thai pohce cus^x!;*! e r e rf the venule was 
r.vit ne^c-^rv, ihe inirr.torv scarth uai. un 
\AUtL 
II.Jarful ,u>: < v of a i irrpojr . !rd ve-
hicle d•<% i)x>\ of i 'v! f d.ipcr.ve u. :h the con 
fore, we must look to the circumstances 
surrounding the stop to determine whether 
the impound |was reasonable. 
the inventory 
City, the polj 
set forth in 
[6,7] It is the burden of the State to 
establish the) necessity for the taking and 
of the vehicle.1' In Salt Lake 
'ice department has standards 
a procedural order" whose 
purpose is tlo implement a procedure for 
the handling of impounds and the use of 
wreckers. Under this order, city police of-
ficers are directed to impound a motor ve-
hicle of an arrested person. However, the 
vehicle may be released at the scene to a 
party designated by the owner rather than 
be impounded. A release form is provided 
to the officers to be signed by the person 
arrested designating an individual to take 
charge of the vehicle and releasing the 
department |and its officers from all liabili-
ty, j... 
Officer Foster testified that he did ascer-
tain that dependant's passenger was not a 
licensed driver. However, defendant was 
given no opportunity to arrange for disposi-
tion of his own car. The officer neither 
asked defendant whether there was some-
one who could come and get the car nor 
asked the (passenger whether she could 
take posses ion of the contents of the car 
or get M>mj'one to come ;»nd get the car. 
stitut iona| 
regard I 
vehicle. 
requirement of reasonableness In 
m a r c h ' s thereafter made of such 
14. Sre, c.rl Oppcrman. 428 U.S. at 375-76, 96 
S O at 3100; Cooper v. California, 386 US 58. 
61-62. 87 jS.Ct. 788, 790-91, 17 L.FeUd 730 
(1967); MiDaniel 156 NJ^uper. at 355. 3S3 
A.2d at 1177; State i. Montague, 73 Wash.2d 
381. 385. 438 P2d 571. 574 (1968). 
15. See Stale v. Goodrich. Minn., 256 N W.2d 
506, 510 ( l |977) . 
16. People 1 S'acel 17 Cal.App 3d 492. 496-97. 95 
Ca! Rptr. 129, 132 (1971) . See also SkDaniel 
156 N' )$>•:\-<r. at 359. 383 A.2d at 1179. 
17. Ordrr N| 
1979 1) 
i>\ t r i a l . 
u m U r 1-79. cffcvti .c date March 1. 
r.'ifcr in .!• cr.tiretv v a** imrc*'-^ rd 
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The departmental order next establishes /State has" not met-its burdea^f showing 
procedures affecting all impounds. In per- \|he jie^essity for the seizure of £K5JeficleV 
tinent part, that order states: 
D. PROCEDURE [AJFFECTIXG ALL 
IMPOUNDS. 
1. When an impound occurs with the 
owner present, the officer should ask 
the owner if an\ thing of value is in the 
vehicle, make certain the owner know** 
what steps are being taken to safe-
guard such property, and proceed as 
follows: 
a. The officer and the wrecker driv-
er should make a thorough inventory 
of the automobile, and fill in the im-
pound slip completely, listing all neces-
sary equipment on the car, in the car, 
and in the trunk. 
b. Any item lying loose in the ve-
hicle should either be turned over to 
the owner or locked in the trunk. 
Small and/or valuable items should be 
placed in Evidence fur Safekeeping un-
less retained by the owner. 
Officer Foster did not ask defendant if 
anything of value was in the vehicle or tell 
defendant of the steps being taken to safe-
guard his property. While all this was 
taking place, defendant was handcuffed 
and in Fo.ster's patrol car. Foster thu* did 
not pvr defendant any opportunity to ar-
range for disposition of his own pru;»ertv. 
Further, the vehicle was parked next to the 
curb in a lawful parking area; no valuables 
were visible, and defendant had not indi-
cated any were extant, a passenger was 
available to remo\e any valuables for safe-
keeping at defendant's request t.rd to ar-
range for a third part} to remove the ve-
hicle, the car could have been locked and 
left unattended; and no evidtr.ee was 
presented to indi ut«* that there wa* a dan-
ger to p dice or pal DLC.1' In thf> cate* the1,, 
18. S<c gtnerclh Annot L-av\fw!ncvs of *"H\c"s:o-
r> Search" of Motor \C*JU!C Ir ;K^' ,JCJ K P^ 
hcc. 45 A t R 3J 537 (1973). 
19. S:c:e\ Jr>< JL, U . }}* So 2d f33 (}* UQ76> 
d CiSc i.; re r.-.:c f (j'tcr L.v'a! , - ; x . . r J 
ment of vchclc p j^-^nt U t C K. l - ; 3 
| 4J-i~iJ5, officers allowed drfrrcfjr.l to re 
*IKAC an> lUms from vehicle he u;vhrd to) 
We are not prepared to say that a true 
inventory search cannot be made in the 
presence of the vehicle's owner and v.ith-
out his consent However, if the purpose 
of the search is truly only to inventory the 
contents of the vehicle and to safeguard 
them during impoundment, an indicia that 
such is the real purpose of the search is to 
consult with the owner of the vehicle when 
he is present at the time of the impound 
and the search.1* 
However, even if it could be determined 
that the impoundment itself was reason-
ably necessary, the search of the vehicle 
trunk was nevertheless not a valid invento-
ry search. As one commentator concluded 
after reviewing Oppcnnan: 
What is needed in the vehicle inventory 
context, then .. is not probable cause 
but rather a regularized set of proce-
dures which adequately guard against 
arbitrariness. 
Inventories should not be upheld under 
Oppcrman unless the government 
shows that there exists an established 
reasonable procedure for safeguarding 
impvUjnded vehicles and their contents 
and that the challenged police activity 
was essentially in conformance with that 
prec* dure./ Thfc means that a purported 
^inventory should be held unlawful when 
it is not show n, "for [instance], that stan-
dard inventory forms were completed 
and kept for future reference (showing 
pruence or absence of valuables), nor 
that a place of safekeeping for valuables 
fco secured was maintained."20 
The Salt Lake City Police Department 
does have a regularized set of procedures 
which are generally drafted to guard 
?; 
20. 2 U r . i \ c . Starch & Sci/urc § 7.4. at 576-77 
(1V75) (f'-otnotc* omitted) (quoting S:ate v Jew-
e!! \*tp*a note 19) S<c also Ptople v />>«& 419 
M.ch 636. 3*9 N W 2d 194 (19S4) (inventor) 
*rj'^h Kcld in\n!'d IK-C.VJV of lack of standard 
p* ' *e p'o eduris for londu nng inventor} 
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against arbitrariness by an officer in the 
field. However, Officer Foster did not fol-
low these procedures- He did not involve 
the owner of the vehicle, who was present, 
in his decision. More importantly, the 
record indicates that he did not completely 
search the vehicle and did not make any 
kind of a list of the items in the automobile, 
much less use a standard inventor}* form. 
Without this, the search cannot be fairly 
characterized as an Inventory search. In 
addition, Officer Foster sent another offi-
cer to the police station to retrieve the 
picture of the robbery suspect even before 
asking defendant for his license and regis-
tration, waited for the picture before begin-
ning the search, and searched with the 
picture in his hand.
 F:The>e facts »ndica|f 
t|iat the •"inventory" search was merely a 
p r e t e x t for a warr»*r,t!r^ st-arch^ Under 
t he's e ci r c u m s ta n ees; * the e v Ice n ce & oco ve iv 1 
ed in defendant's" trunk should h^ve been, 
^suppressed as,. Lhe,fl,n:su!t. of aji "improper,""" 
warrantless search. Defendant's convic-
tion is thus reversed and the case remand-
ed for a new trial. 
Defendant's second point on appeal is 
that the trial court denied defendant his 
constitutional right to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him l»ecau>v dtfend-
ant's counsel was not allowed to cross-cx-
arnine the State's witnesses specifically re-
garding how the survt i'Lrice camera v as 
activated. Defendant argued he wished to 
present the defense of whether, in fact, the 
camera was activated at the time of the 
robbery or could have K-en activated at 
some earlier time. The State object d to 
cross-examination cor.a rning the precise 
method of activation, arguing that the need 
to maintain secrecy outweighed any need 
defendant might have for the information. 
The trial judge refused to allow cross-ex-
amination on that aspect on the ground 
that it was not relevant given the SCO;H? of 
dirt-el examination. 
21. Fnher v Starr, 7 Ark App 1, h-*. e-i? S U 2d 
571. 573-74 (19S2). Sicie \ HeiJi-*>..n. I JO 
N.M 2fO. 2 H - 4 2 . 6*9 V:d 736. 73T-?C M ^ 3 » 
At trial, the State offered as evidence 
photographs developed from the film taken 
from the surveillance camera on the night 
of the robbery. The gas station clerk testi-
fied that he had been instructed how to 
activate the camera. During the robbery, 
he did so while emptying the cash register 
of the money. The clerk further testified 
that he knew the camera was operating 
because of motor sounds and soft clicks 
coming from the camera. The police detec-
tive who haa installed the crime-eye camera 
at the gas station testified that the camera 
was operating properly. He further testi-
fied that if the camera was activated, an 
alarm went mf at the police dispatch office. 
Since installation, the camera had been acti-
vated and the alarm had gone off only 
twice: once on November 6 and once on 
December 31. The first time, on November 
6, the detective had returned to the gas 
station, reloaded the camera, and reset i t 
Prior to resetting the camera, the detective 
made several exposures of his own face on 
the first few frames of the film to ensure 
that the camera was operating properly. 
The contact print of the film taken from 
the camera on the night of December 31 
shows the face of the detective in the first 
few frames, then the photos identified as 
these of defendant. Additional testimony 
was adduced from several officers which 
established the chain of custody of the film 
and subsequently developed photographs. 
The tr.al judge admitted the photographs. 
T;.t re are two basic theories upon which 
photographic evidence is admitted: the "si-
lent witness]' theory and the "pi- torial tes-
timony" theory.*1 Under the first theory, 
properly authenticated photographs are "si-
K nt witnesses" that speak for themselves 
and constitute independent, substantive evi-
dence of what they portray, independent of 
a sponsoring witness.12 Under the "pictori-
al testimony]' theory, the photographic evi-
dence is illustrative of a witness's testimo* 
nv and onlv becomes admissible when a 
<j c n. c § 7 'yj 
22 Id <»c t 
\d f .; p 19 c4); 3 J W i p n o r c , Evi 
(Chadtv,urn rc \ . 1970). 
l\it I'nitrd Stales v. C^fre, "-* 
3 (W I) Pu 1(<75). 
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OUcas7!IPJd264 (Hah 1985) 
sponsoring witness can testify that it is a on the cross-examination could reasonably 
fair and accurate representation of the sub-
ject matter based on that witness's person-
al observation.0 
The photos introduced at trial were intro-
duced under the secor.d theory. The clerk 
was shown two photographs taken by the 
surveillance camera ar.d asked if each con-
stituted a fair and accurate representation 
of the individual who c o n f i n e d the rob-
bery, both the person and the clothes he 
was wearing. The clerk replied that those 
photos were the robber in the act cf rob-
bing the station. Thus, the photos were 
authenticated by the testimony of a witness 
with knowledge that the photos were what 
they claimed to b e : : 4 photo? of defendant 
robbing the gas s ta t ion. 5 
18] The right to confrontation :r:!udes 
the right to cross-examine witnesses.2* 
However, this right L^  not abse.ate. The 
trial court has discretion in limiting the 
scope an d extent of cross-* \.*T..r.ation.r 
Absent an abuse of that d>cretion. this 
Court will not disturb the ruling. 
Defendant's counsel had ample opportu-
nity to cross-examine the pas station clerk ^ t e T c o n s t h u t i o n ' n n d ' b v article r, sertioi? 
concerning the accuracy of h:s rrx^ory of g 1 4 o f , h f U ( a h C o n s U t u t " i o n . However,"* 
car.not agree with two assumptions implicit 
in the majority opinion: first, that the 
be expected to have a substantial effect on 
the jury 's decision.28 Testimony a£ to how 
the camera was activated could not reason-
ably be expected to have had a substantial 
effect on the jury 's decision in the face of 
the clerk's testimony that the photographs' 
depicted the man who robbed the station in 
the act, the clerk's personal identification 
of defendant as the man in the photo, and 
the foundational testimony authenticating 
the photographs. Under these circum-
stances, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion. 
Defendant's conviction is reversed and 
the case remanded for a new trial in ac-
cordance with this opinion. 
STEWART and HOWE, JJ. , concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring Sep-
arately). 
I join in the Court 's reversal of the con-
viction of defendant Hygh. -The impound-"] 
ment and search of defendant's automobile^* 
v ^ J a t c d h l s right to be free from unreason-
able s e a r c h e s and seizures, as guaranteed 
bV the fourth amendment to the United 
the individual robber and clothes, whether 
in fact the clerk did activate the camera, 
and how he knew it wa5 activated. De-
fendant took full advantage of that oppor-
tunity. Defendant also had the opportuni-
ty to cross-examine the i>o!.Ve dc t r ; ; : \ e and 
officers who testified concern:r.c the sur-
\e ilia nee camera. The only que.-:. :. de-
fendant was not allowed to a-k v.^ > how 
.specifically the can.era was actr. attd 
scorn? of the warrant requirement under 
article 3, section 14 is congruent with that 
devtl-pvd by the federal courts under the 
fourth amendment; second, that the reme-
dy for a violation of Utah's search and 
Seizure provision is the same as the remedy 
for a Nidation of the federal provision—ex-
clus; »n of the evidence seized. 
19. 10] A vir , 1 , . 
n)u 
of the cor.fr, 
clause does not occur urntss the I:r;.;tatijn 
23. Supra ru>\c 21. 
24. S<c Vtiiud Sides » A.V.Vj-r. 439 F-Sjp? 103, 
105 <L.D.Pa 1977). F^hc\ 7 \:K Ap? a: 6, 643 
S.W.?d at 574; A- -.V i A —.. M> C:' App 3d 
608, 131 C;J! P.J if. T ? (1-76). 
tation The federal law regarding warrantless 
•arches and seizures lias become a laby-
25, 
i n ; 
T l i 
!u i 
d . . 
T h e p h o 
[ n ^ d i K c d 
n ' u f<»rc. \ 
l i o n o f i h 
nc so. 
!(;,' 
u r, 
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IS 
•,dcr 
<'<j r 
p<i .n l 
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• • : « L . 
[ Vk ~. 
re 
"y. 
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; r r . ' 
C '; '• 
I c 
• 7 -
'. v% . 
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. r 7 y - r . f i 
T : N C i 
• : r . r r < -
i J .v . 
t o be 
h c o r y . 
- ;cv> 
5:a tc 
26. A-M-ii v. Alaska, 415 VS. 308. 316-17, 94 S.Cl. 
1105. 1110-11. 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). 
27. Ch^ibcrs v. Mississippi, 410 VS. 284, 295, 93 
SCi. 103?. 1045-46. 35 LSd.ld 297 (1973). 
2S. L'r.iied States v. Farnmvrth, 729 V26 1158. 
11*2 <f:h C$r.l9i?4). Hughes \ Feints, 641 F.26 
7=0. ""^.(-ih Cir.1931). 
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rinth of rules built upon a series of contra-
dictor}7 and confusing rationalizations and 
distinctions. Police officers and judges at-
tempting to make their way through this 
labyrinth often imperil both the rights of 
Adividuals and the integrity and effective-
ness of law enforcement See, e,g., Wer-
'miel, Reeent Rulings Leaxx Police More 
Confused About Wliat's Legal, Wall StJ., 
August 9, 19S5, at 1, col. 1. In many cases, 
the exclusionary rule, adopted by the feder-
al courts as the sole remedy for fourth 
amendment violations, appears to have in-
fluenced, if not controlled, the scope of the 
constitutional right it was designed to fur-
ther. Many of the arcane rules developed 
to justify warrantless searches seem to 
have been fashioned solely to avoid the 
consequences of the exclusionary rule. 
Sound arguments may be made in favor 
of positions at ^variance with the current 
federal law respecting both the scope of 
the individual's right to be free from war-
rantless searches and seizures and the rem-
edy for any violation of that right Accept-
ance by this Court of such arguments un-
der the Utah Constitution's search and sei-
zure provision might result in simpler rules 
that can be more easily followed by police 
officers and the courts. At the same time, 
these rules might provide the public with 
greater and more consistent protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
by eliminating many of the confusing ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement that 
have been developed in recent years.1 
One way to improve predictability might 
be to sharply limit the sweep of exceptions 
1. Recently, the United States Supreme Cnart has 
attempted to provide police with rclatueh clear 
standards for warranties* automobile searches 
by sweeping away many of the subtle and in-
consistent rules that governed this area. In 
Vniicd Slates \\ Ross. 456 VS. 79S. 102 S.Ct. 
2157, 12 LXA 2d 572 (1952). the Court held that 
if police officers lawfully stop a vehicle, they 
may conduct a warrantless search of all com-
partments and containers within the vehicle if 
they have probable cause to bchc\c that contra-
band is concealed somewhere in the car. In my 
\iew, this belated attempt to bring consistency 
and coherence to automobile searches fails be-
cause it csv/n!ia!l> k'uts the fourth amendment's 
warrant rcipjiic ment av it pcMains to automo-
bile searches. Sse 456 I S at f 27. 102 S Ct at 
to the warrant requirement that often raise 
questions of police overreaching. In their 
place, clear-cut rules could be adopted—for 
example, a flat requirement that a warrant 
must be obtained before any nonconsensu-
al search of property not in the immediate 
physical cbntrol of a suspect is conducted.1 
Such a rule would be an improvement over 
present law, both for the individual and for 
the policy. The individual would be as-
sured thai, in most cases, * his property 
would not be searched or seized ume~ssth^f 
reasons for the search or seizure have first 
been presented to a neutral magistrate and 
a:warrant issued. At the same time, police 
officers would not be forced to speculate 
about what may or may not be subject to 
fthout a warrant ^Warrantless search w 
searches 
Ihey salts 
£o protect! 
jwould.be permitted only where 
ffy their traditional justification— 
'...the safety of officers or to pre-
vent the destruction of evidence^ See, eg." 
xChimel v\ California, "395 UlS. 752, 762-
G3, S9 S.Cpt. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L.Ed.2d G85 
(1969). Once the threat that the suspect 
will injure the officers with concealed 
weapons pr will destroy evidence is gone, 
there is nb persuasive reason why the offi-
cers cannpt take the time to secure a war-
rant 
requirement ^(^Tfj^'presenf little" 
it to poiice investigations, espe-
:Such a 
impedinie 
<; ctally in 
rants can) 
[phonic w; 
23-4(2) (j 
Utah, 67(1 
important] 
2174 (Mi 
reason tq 
I { (juircs 
by the u 
premc Ct 
184-85 (( 
fght of the ease with which war-
be obtained under Utah's tele-. 
rrant statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-
982 ed.).ySee State v. Lopez, 
P.2d 393 (19S4). Perhaps most 
!y, such a rule could be readily 
|»rshall, J., dissenting). There is little 
believe that effective law enforcement 
this sacrifice of the interests protected 
pnant requirement. See, e.g., The Su-
,urt—!98J Term, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 176, 
982). 
-. "Immediate physical control" refers to an area 
within vjhich a suspect could reasonably be 
expected'to £rab a weapon or destroy evidence 
during ah encounter with police officer!. The 
exception would be limited by its justification 
and would not generally permit warrantless 
vcarchrsjof car trunks, for example, or contain-
ers bc\ond the suspect's reach. 
MUNICIPAL BLDG. AUTHORITY v. LOWDER Utah 2 7 3 
Che**711 PJUS 273 (U*l» tm5) 
understood and complied with by police of-
ficers, and evidence unco\ered in compli-
ance v«ith it would more than satisfy the 
requirements of the fourth amendment to 
the federal constitution. 
Sound rrgurocnts can also be made 
against acceptance of the ftderal \crsion of 
the evcljMuniry rule as the sole remedy 
for unlawful searches and seizures. See 
generally Coe, The A LI SubstahtiQlity 
Test A Flixible Approach to the Exclu-
sionary Saiiction, 10 Ga L Rev. 1 (1975); 
Sthrotder , Dehrnng Fourth Amcndvtent 
Violations: Alteniatiivs to the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 69 Geo L J . 1361 (19SI). Al-
though this Court has tacitly followed the 
federal lead on this matter, I ha \e found no 
case in which this Court has decided to 
adopt the exclusionary rule after indepen-
dent!} anal}zing the question of what rem-
edy is a\ailable for an unlawful search or 
seizure under our state constitution. Per-
force, this Court has ne \e r considered the 
apprupr! itcness of possible exceptions to 
the e\clucionary rule or the a \a ihb? ' ty of 
a l ternate e or supplemental remedies, such 
as the imposition of ci\il habiht} on police 
officers. 
I do not suggest that without farther 
consideration this Court should either 
adopt the h\poth( tical warrantless search 
and Mj?urt rule discussed abo\e or n jec t 
iIK txcluMonar} rule as a re med> for \ iola-
tions of article I, section 14 I onl} contend 
that su 'h a r /uments should not be fore-
closed from con 'deration b\ ou r vr ;n.a-
lwed acceptance of the federal p M'jon 
The il 1 iw as it currenth e\^;> is 
ct rt i» 1\ not the onl} permissible mte r; no-
tation of the t^ ireh and <H*~ure prott ~t ">ns 
confined in the I L.h C ^ r c t ' u t »n3 If, 
after consideration, we cwT °\i k ix t we 
Cc.n stnl- i a balance bet »Kt n the cc "
 t < t ng 
Hitere Ls imohed so as to better *erve 
them all, then we should not hesitate to do 
so Sic generally Linde, E Plunb *s— 
3. Dc\clopin£ a jurisprudence of s'atc ce~«' tu 
tio^a! lau is not a no\cl idea For c u i p ' c the 
s uic of Washmgicn has i.vcrprcicJ :: cc «' ;u 
li i1 iffh *ir d sea/ ire rrtvjsjr^i d ( ~ c "• 11\ 
if ~ri the I'nj'cd S'alcs Sap o r e Coart v . \ « cr 
prckd the fuutih arnci dr cat S*e \ *. I s>4» 
Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 
IS G a L R e v . 1G5 (1984); see also Massa-
chusetts r. Upton, 104 S C t 2085, 2089-91 
(19S4) (Stevens, J , concurring). 
DURHAM, J , concurs in the concurring 
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY 
OF IRON COUNTY, Utah, a Utah non-
profit corpora t ion , and Iron County, a 
bod\ corporate and politic, Plaintiffs 
and Respondents , 
v. 
Dennis LOWDER, indhidual l> and a* 
count} audi tor of Iron County; and 
Clair Hulet, indi\ idua!I> and as county 
clerk of Iron C o u n t ) , Defendants and 
Appellant*. 
No. 19959. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
No\ 27, 1985 
Count) and iLs municipal building au-
thority brought action against eoi nt) offi 
c ia l \ seeking declarator) relief an l v nt of 
r i a r^ i rnus to compel count) of fnals to 
e a r n oat tl e lr «Jk ^e d dutu s in ( onnection 
with count) ' s plan for financing construe-
tjon of ncu jail facility. The District 
Co^rt, Iron County, George E Ralhf, J., 
upheld actions of county, and the county 
officials appealed The Supreme Court, 
Zimmerman, J., held that (1) debt of mu-
nicipal housing authority for which county 
wai rot rtSj>onsible v.as not subject to debt 
i" i C^tf\nturi t), Ssarihtng for 77 rory Ariicfr t, 
SU.ion 7, 8 U Pufecl Sound L Rc\ 331 (1985) 
"Vac s \ ic c f V i \ a has alvo cons rued us sc.irch 
a-J v rurc pro\«sion to provjdc hn ider prolec 
t i Rrc CJ \ S uc A! la. 599 P ?d 727, 734 
(1*73) 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
Adolfo Diaz MENDOZA, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
Alberto Ruiz MENDIETA, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 20922. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dee. 1, 19*7. 
Evidence obtained during search of car 
*..•• suppressed by the Fifth District Court, 
W. liUie/(»n County, J. Harlan Burns, J., 
a -
:
 'he >>l:{\>- appealed. The Supreme 
, ;. D'iri..<mt J . held that: (1) there was 
• ; ' tva.-..'liable suspicion for border patrol 
••ff:«vrs to stop north bound vehicle con-
• .•..n!ng "Latin-appearing" occupants and 
STATE 
iter A% 74r t 
v. MENDOZA 
F..2d 181 (Utah 1987) 
nervous be} 
Const.Amen 
avlor of oecup 
1. 4. 
i; 
. t . t s . 
tab 
U 
181 
SC.A 
d:.M,l 
"^pla>in California license plates; (2) 
K'>'.-d faith exception to exclusionary rule 
r
-mnut apply to investigatory stop and 
*«-areh; and (3) the Fourth Amendment En-
forcement Act is unconstitutional. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, J., filed a concurring opin-
ion. 
Hall, C.J., and Howe, J., filed separate 
concurring and dissenting opinions. 
1- Aliens C=53.8 
border patrol officers' stop of vehicle 
°
:
- inu-rstate highway was not supported 
''>' n•'!• onable suspicion based on apparent 
l-V:n descent" of occupants, route of trav-
^ : e of day, time of year, California 
::
 ' '•'-' plat. "erratic driving behavior in 
^;ti vehicle did not inv: .ediately vacate left 
'^•<- whrn officers approached at high 
*Pwj then, after being tailed at distance of 
l
*o to six feet, switched to right lane and 
suddenly slowed down, and subsequent 
2. Criminal Law C=>391.lr2> 
Good-faith exception to exclusionary 
rule can never apply to investigatory stop 
and search in that, if no reasonable] suspi-
cion exists to justify investigatory stop, 
officer's conduct was not reasonable within 
meaning of the exception and, in any evvnt, 
exception cannot operate where no outside 
authority on which officers reasonably re-
lied expressly authorized the search). U.S. 
C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
3. Criminal Law <3=39t.i<2) 
Searches and Seizures C-12 
The Fourth Amendment Enforcement 
Act is unconstitutional in purporting to cre-
ate a "good faith" exception to exclusion-
ary rule with respect to investigatory 
stops. U.C.A.1953, 77-3.VH2(g): ip.S.C.A. 
Const. A mend. 4. 
4. Criminal Law <S=39L1<2). 391.^(1) 
Searches and Seizures C^12 
Even wliere "good faith" exce )tion to 
Fourth 
nconsti-
proof to 
in bad 
exclusionary rule is applicable, th 
Amendment Enforcement Act is uj 
tutional, both in shifting burden of 
defendant to prove police conduct) 
faith and in requiring illegal conduct that 
goes beyond being objectively unreason-
able. U.C.A.1953, 77-3f>-12(g), (gjc2)(i, ii); 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
David L. Wilkinson, David B. Thlompson, 
Salt Lake City, Peter L. Rog die, St. 
George, for plaintiff and appellant. 
J. MacArthur Wright. John Miles, St. 
George, for defendant and respondent Men-
doza. 
John E. Meyers, I-os Angde.-, California, 
for defendant and respondent Me[ndieta. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The State brought th;- appealI to chal-
lenge the trial court's suppression of evi-
dence obtained during a search of the car 
in which defendants were traveling. The 
State assigns as error the trial cojurt's use 
of a probable cause standard to determine 
the validity of the stop, the tn\4l court's 
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finding that defendants had standing to 
challenge the validity of the search, and the 
trial court's failure to make findings pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35~12(g) 
(11)82). We affirm. 
The following summary of the facts is 
based on testimony from both the suppres-
sion hearing and the preliminary hearing. 
The trial judge relied on testimony from 
both in granting the motion to suppress. 
On March 16, 1985, two United States 
Immigration Service border patrol officers 
observed the northbound traffic on 1—15 
south of St. George, Utah, from a car 
parked on the median for that purpose. 
Their car was green, with official decals on 
both doors and a light bar mounted on the 
roof. At approximately 4:50 a.m., three 
cars approached the officer's position, in-
cluding the black Mustang in which defend-
ants were traveling. Officer Stiegler testi-
fied that his partner, Officer Fox, told him 
that the car deserved a closer look because 
the occupants appeared to be of Latin de-
scent. Officer Fox, however, testified at 
the suppression hearing that he could not 
remember making the statement concern-
ing defendants' apparent ethnic origin. 
Officer Fox, the driver of the border 
patrol car, pulled onto the highway and 
began to pursue the black Mustang. In 
order to catch up with it before it reached a 
rest stop, where the officers could view the 
car and its passengers with the aid of road-
side lights, the officers followed the Mus-
tang at high speed. When they caught up 
with defendants' vehicle, it failed to leave 
the left lane despite the~ officers' rapid ap-
proach; however, neither officer could tes-
tify that the occupants of the Mustang had 
seen the officers' car approach. The offi-
cers matched the Mustang's speed and fol-
lowed at a distance of two to six feet. The 
officers then noticed that the Mustang had 
California license plates. 
The Mustang eventually pulled into the 
right lane and decelerated rapidly. Both 
officers described the car's movements as 
"jerky." The officers pulled alongside the 
Mustang, dropped back, and then pulled 
alongside the car again. With the aid of 
the lights from the rest stop, the officers 
determined th.it defendants appeared to be 
of "Latin descent" and behaved "nervous 
ly." When asked to describe defendants' 
behavior more specifically, however, the of-
ficers testified only that defendants avoid-
ed eye contact with the officers. Based on 
the time of year, the California license 
plates on the car, defendants' "nervous" 
behavior, defendants' physical characteris-
tics, and the "jerky" driving, the officers 
decided to pull the Mustang over and ques-
tion defendants concerning their citizenship 
status. 
The officers questioned both defendants, 
and neither was able to produce adequate 
identification. The officers arrested de-
fendants and placed them in the back of 
the officers' car. At this point, the officers 
opened the t**unk of the Mustang to deter-
mine if it contained any other passengers 
and discovered the fifty-one bags of mari-
juana that were the subject of the motion 
to suppress. 
We consider first the propriety of the 
initial stop. The State contends that the 
trial judge improperly assessed the validity 
of the stop under a probable cause stan-
dard instead of the appropriate "reasonable 
suspicion" standard. The plain language 
of the suppression order does not, however, 
support the State's position. The order 
reads, "[Tjhere were no (articulable) facts 
as a basis or probable cause for the stop." 
(Emphasis added.) Use of the disjunctive 
indicates that the trial judge found not only 
a lack of probable cause, but also a lack of 
any basis whatsoever for the stop. The 
transcript of the trial court's ruling sup-
ports this interpretation. The transcript 
indicates that the trial judge found "there 
was no basis for the original stop," without 
making any reference to a lack of probable 
cause. Although inclusion of the probable 
cause language in the order confuses the 
standard applied by the trial court, that 
language does not indicate that the trial 
judge suppressed the evidence in question 
solely because the facts failed to meet the 
more restrictive probable cause standard. 
[1] Even under the "reasonable suspi-
cion" standard announced in United States 
i\ Brignoru-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 
STATE v. 
CUc d» 748 P_2d 
S.Ct 2571, 25*1, 45 L Ed 2d (.07 (1975), the 
facts known to the border patrol officers at 
the time they stopped the Mustang did not 
justify the stop In Brignoni-Ponce, the 
United States Suprer Court reviewed the 
propriety of a stop, '>ased solely on the 
"Mexican*' appearand of a vehicle's three 
occupants, to investigate the possible trans-
portation of illegal aliens. The Court held, 
"Except at the border and its functional 
equivalents, officers on roving patrol may 
stop vehicles only if they are aware of 
specific, articulable facts, together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, that rea-
sonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles 
contain aliens who may be illegally in the 
country." Id The sole fact relied upon by 
the border patrol officers in Brignom-
Pomt was the "apparent Mexican ances-
tr>" of the vehicle's occupants Id at 885— 
86, 95 SCt. at 2582-83 The Court held 
that apparent Mexican ancestry alone did 
not furnish "reasonable grounds to believe 
thyt the three occupants were aliens." Id. 
at 886, 95 S C\ at 2582. 
In Biignom-Ponce, the Court listed sev-
eral factors for consideration in determin-
ing if the officers had reasonable suspicion 
to justify the stop of the suspect vehicle: 
(1) the characteristics of the area, including 
its proximity to the border, usual traffic 
patterns, and previous experience with 
alien traffic; (2) information concerning re-
cent border crossings in the area; (3) the 
driver's behavior, including erratic driving 
or an obvious attempt to evade officers; (4) 
the characteristics of the vehicle itself, 
such as its size and observations indicating 
that the vehicle is heavily loaded; (5) 
whether the occupants of the vehicle are 
trying to conceal themselves, and (6) 
whether the occupants have a characteris-
tic Mexican appearance, i.e., particular 
style of haircut or dress. The officer is 
entitled to assess the facts available to him 
in light of his experience. Id at 881-85, 95 
SCt. at 2581-82. In determining whether 
the facts support a reasonable suspicion 
that a vehicle is engaged in illegal activity, 
the trial court must consider the totality of 
the circumstances facing the officers. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-
18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 
MhMM)ZA LJtah 183 
181 { l u h I9h7) 
(19M). The reviewing court s| 
overturn the trial court's detenu 
less it is clearly errontou-.. Id. a 
also State v. Gallrgo*. 712 P 2d 
09 (Utah 19>5). A review of tr 
this case indicates that the trij 
order suppressing the questio 
dence was not clearly erroneoui 
The officers in this case relied on the 
following facts in determining 
had a reasonable suspicion justl 
stop of the Mustang (1) the appa 
in descent" of the occupants of 
tang; (2) the route of travel; (3) (he time of 
day, (4) the time of year, (5) the 
huuld not 
Ination un-
it 416; see 
207, 208-
- facts in 
til judge's 
nable evi-
that they 
ifying the 
rent "Lat-
the Mus-
California 
license plates; (6) the erratic driving pat-
tern; and (7) the nervous behavior of the 
occupants. 
As to the first factor, Officer Stiegler 
simply testified that the occupants of the 
Mustang appeared to be of "I>atin de-
scent." He did not identify any Icharacter-
istics observed before the stop, such as 
clothing or haircut, that would indicate 
Mexican nationality. Many United States 
citizens and residents have physical charac-
teristics that might be classified as Latin. 
Without other observations concerning 
physical characteristics that would indicate 
alien status, Latin appearance has only mi-
nor probative value in determining if a 
suspect has entered the countrV illegally. 
Likewise, the Mustang's route of travel 
and California license plates have little pro-
bative value in determining if the officers 
had a reasonable suspicion to stop the ve-
hicle. The officers testified that 1-15 is 
frequently used by those involved in trans-
porting illegal aliens from the California-
Mexico border to destinations north and 
east of California. However, Ij-15 is also 
the only major interstate highway for legal 
traffic to locations northeast of Southern 
California It seems unlikely that illegal 
alien transporters comj.rI.-e a significant 
portion of interstate traffic on 1-15 at dis-
tances as far from the Mexican border as 
St. George, Utah. 
Similarly, the time of year arid the time 
of day of the stop have little relevance. 
Although the density of the trafjfic on 1-15 
varies, travelers use the interstate highway 
181 Utah 7 48 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
at all times of the day and night and at all 
times of the year. See, e.g., United States 
v. Shield*, 534 F.2d G05, 608 (5th Cir.1976). 
But cf. United States v. Quiroz-Carra^co, 
565 F.2d 1328, 1330 (5th Cir.1978) (defend-
ants stopped on a road at a 'time when 
virtually no local traffic was present). 
The officers also testified that they relied 
on defendants' erratic driving behavior in 
deciding to stop the Mustang. When asked 
to describe this behavior more specifically, 
however, they merely cited defendants' ini-
tial failure to yield the left lane to the 
approaching patrol car and their subse-
quent lane change and rapid deceleration. 
We do not see how this behavior would 
give rise to a suspicion that the occupants 
of the car were engaged in illegal activity. 
Defendants made no attempt to evade the 
officers; rather, they changed lanes and 
slowed down If anything, defendants' 
conduct facilitated their apprehension by 
the officers 
The final fact relied upon by the officers 
was defendants' "nervous behavior.' 
When asked to describe defendants' behav-
ior more specifically, the officers merely 
stated that defendants' had a "white-
knuckled" or rigid look and failed to make 
eye contact The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that the failure to make 
eye contact can have no weight in deter-
mining if the officers had a reasonable 
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. 
United States v. Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 
86-87 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lo-
pez, 564 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir.1977). 
Additionally, several of the factors listed 
in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 88,5-86, 95 
S.Ct. at 2582-83, are absent here. Defend-
ants did not try to evade the officers, nor 
did they attempt to conceal anyone or any-
thing when the officers began pursuing the 
Mustang. The car did not meet the typical 
profile of a vehicle used for smuggling, nor 
was there any indication that the vehicle 
was heavily loaded. See United States v. 
Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (5th Cir. 
1984) (several factors including the appear-
I. The officers testified that license plates from 
other states on the United States-Mexico border, 
as well as those from states that arc the typical 
ance of tin occupants and the heavily load-
ed truck u t re sufficient to uphold an inves-
tigatory stop). Finally, the officers 
stopped the car a considerable distance 
from the Mexican border. 
Adopting the State's position would es-
sentially authorize the stop of all north-
bound vehicles on 1-15 containing "Latin-
appearing" occupants and displaying sus-
pect state license plates.1 Such a holding 
would substantially interfere with the 
fourth amendment rights of those travel-
ers. We hold that the facts in this case do 
not support a reasonable suspicion that de-
fendants were engaged in illegal activity; 
therefore, the trial court's finding that the 
stop violated defendants' fourth amend-
ment rights was not clearly erroneous. 
Our holding that the investigatory stop 
violated defendants' fourth amendment 
rights obv iates the need to discuss the pro-
pria} of the search. Because we find the 
stop itself unconstitutional, all evidence 
subsequent!) seized is inadmissible See, 
e.g. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 83 SCt 407, 9 L Ed.2d 441 (1963), 4 
W, LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11 4(d), 
at 407-08 (2d cd 1987). 
Our holding a^  to the unconstitutionality 
of the initial stop also eliminates the neces-
sity to address the standing issue. Be-
cause the State' based its standing argu-
ment on the propriety of the search, and 
because the validity of the search does not 
affect our holding, we do not discuss de-
fendants' standing to challenge the search. 
We next turn to the State's challenge to 
the trial court's failure to make the find-
ings required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-12(g) U9b2), part of the Fourth 
Amendment Enforcement Act Pursuant 
to that section, a trial court may only sup-
press evidence when it finds a substantial 
fourth amendment violation that was not 
made in good faith A defendant must 
first piove a substantial violation by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The State 
must then pro\e good faith on the part of 
the police officer in order to prevent sup-
destinations for illegal alien traffic, would have 
aroused their suspicion. 
STATE v. 
Cite as 748 P 2d 
predion of the evidence. Ihe section fur-
ther requires the trial court to state its 
reasons for finding a substantial violation 
and a lack of good faith. In considering 
this assignment of error, we first deter-
mine whether section 77-35-12(g) meets 
federal constitutional standards. 
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 
1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the United 
States Supreme Court applied the exclu-
sionary rule to the states by virtue of the 
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 655, 81 S.Ct. 
at 1691. As a result, the United States 
Constitution requires suppression of evi-
dence seized pursuant to a search or sei-
zure made in violation of the fourth amend 
ment. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S 
897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), 
however, the Court created an exception to 
blanket application of the exclusionary 
rule. The Court held that the rule does not 
apply where the state establishes that an 
officer exhibited "objectively reasonable" 
reliance on a magistrate's probable cause 
determination and on the technical suffi-
ciency of the search warrant issued. Id. at 
922-23, 104 S.Ct at 3420-21. 
Although Leon involved a search con-
ducted pursuant to a subsequently invali-
dated warrant, the State argues that the 
Leon holding does not restrict application 
of the "good faith" exception to warrant-
less searches. Admittedly, much of the 
language in Leon intimates a broader appli-
cation of the rule. While the State correct-
ly argues that no language in the Leon 
opinion specifically restricts application of 
the exception to searches pursuant to a 
warrant,2 we do not agree that it can apply 
2. We note that much of the language in Leon 
suggests a broader application of the rule. For 
example, the Court states that the exclusionary 
rule should not appk' to objecthel) reasonable 
police activity and that this is especially true 
where the officer has obtained a search warrant 
and acted within r^ scope. Leon, 468 U.S. at 
919-20, 104 S O . at 3418-19. This language 
imphes that all objectively reasonable police 
conduct should enjoy immunity from the exclu-
sionary rule and that obtaining a warrant has 
the effect of creating an even greater presump-
tion of validity of the police activity as long as 
the officer obtained the warrant in good faith. 
Because the statute, by its terms, applies to all 
motions to suppress evidence without distin-
guishing between motions to challenge vvarrant-
MI:M)OZA 
\Hl (U tah 19>7) 
to warranties searches of| 
volved in this ea-e. 
The basU for the Leon exception is that 
the exclusionary rule servt 
pose than to puni.-h law enforcement offi-
cers for knowingly or negligently conduct-
ing a wrongful search and to deter such 
conduct in the future. Id. kt 918-21, 104 
S.Ct. at 341S-19. When, holvevir, a police 
officer obtains a warrant and relies on it 
with objective reasonableness, exclusion of 
the evidence due to a subset 
tion of the warrant would 
pose. Id. Thus, the opiniqr 
is that excluding illegally-sc 
Utah 185 
the kind in-
no other pur-
pient invalida-
serve no pur-
n's foundation 
leized evidence 
when a police officer has received authori-
zation to conduct a search, has restricted 
his search to the boundaries of the authori-
zation, and has a reasonable basis for rely-
ing on the authorization wOuld defeat the 
ends of justice. 
[2] Whether or not we agree with the 
Leon view of the exclusionary rule's pur-
pose, the exception cannot (operate in this 
situation for two reasons, rfirst, no outside 
authority on which the officers could rea-
sonably rely expressly Authorized the 
search of the vehicle; therefore, the policy 
foundations of the Leon exception do not 
appear in searches of the ijintr involved in 
this case.3 
pt on Second, the Leon exce 
terms, could never apply tol 
ry stop and search. As w 
discussed, Brignoni-Ponee 
of evidence obtained durin. 
ducted after an investigatory 
by its own 
an investigato-
e have already 
permits the use 
a search con-
stop only 
less scaiches from mono) 
searches conducted pursuant 
the broader app!leation of th|e 
ception suggested in the Le 
the scop>e of the statute 
hs to challenge 
Jto a \\ air ant, only 
"good faith" ex-
dicta can justify 
3. In Illinois v. Krull. — U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 
1160, 94 L.Ed2d 364 (19S7), the United States 
Supreme Court extended the Leon exception to a 
situation where the police conducted a search 
pursuant to a subsequently invalidated statute. 
fd, 107 S.Ct. at 1167. Krull Jloes not affect our 
characterization of Leon. In both cases, the 
officers conducting the searches did so in objec-
tively reasonable reliance on (prior, external au-
thorization. 
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when articulable facts give rise to a reason-
able suspicion. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
at 88 i, 95 S.Ct. at 2581. In essence, this 
require^ objectively reasonable conduct in 
the decision to search, the same objective 
reasonableness that an officer must exer-
cise when relying on a subsequently invali-
dated search warrant. If no reasonable 
suspicion exists to justify an investigatory 
stop, rendering a subsequent search illegal, 
th>m the officer whose conduct is in ques-
tion <^uld not have acted reasonably. 
Thus, ,tiQ Leon exception could never apply 
to an .nvalidated investigatory stop and 
search. 
[.']] Because Leon could never apply to 
investigatory stops and searches, and be-
cause the Fourth Amendment Enforcement 
Act purports to create a "good faith" ex-
ception to such searches, that Act violates 
the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
[\] Even assuming for the sake of ar-
gument that the "good faith" exception 
established by Leon applies to the type of 
search involved in this case, the statutes in 
question here are still unconstitutional. 
Section 77-35-12(g)(1) requires defendants 
to establish a substantial violation of their 
fourth amendment rights. A violation is 
"substantial" under section 77-35-12(g)(2) 
if 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, 
willful, malicious, shocking to the con-
science of the court or was a result of 
the practice of the law enforcement 
agency pursuant to a general order of 
that agency; 
(ri) The violation was intended only to 
harass without legitimate law enforce-
ment purposes. 
This threshold requirement is beyond the 
scope of the "good faith" exception for two 
reasons. First, Leon establishes an excep-
tion to the applicability of the exclusionary 
rule. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. at 
3420. Pursuant to Mapp, if the defendant 
establishes a fourth amendment violation, 
the illegally-seized evidence must be sup-
4, The stop in this case and section 77-35-12(g) 
both fall below the standards required by the 
fourth amendment to the United Slates Consti-
pre>->ed regardless of the egregiousness of, 
or the intentions motivating, the police offi-
cers' conduct Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 
S.Ct. at 161)1. Because Leon is an excep-
tion to the application of the exclusionary 
rule, the State must prove the necessary 
elements of the "good faith" exception 
Section 77-35-12(g), however, shifts the 
burden of proof to the defendant, who 
must pnne the equivalent of police conduct 
made in bad faith before the court can 
apply the exclusionary rule. 
Subsections (i) and (ii) of section 77-35-
12(g)(2) a'so exceed the bounds of the ex-
ception established in Leon because both 
require less than objectively reasonable 
conduct in order for section 77-35-12(g) to 
pro\ide an exception. Pursuant to the 
broad reading of Leon, a court will not 
admit the illegally-seized evidence if it 
finds the police conduct objectively urma 
sonab!e Conduct that is objectively unrta-
sonable, however, is not equivalent to 
grossly negligent, willful, or malicious con-
duct; nor does it always arise from either 
an intent to harass or pursuant to depart-
ment \c\\c\ Because subsections (i) and 
(ii) of section 77-3.5-12(g)(2) validate con-
duct that is not objectively reasonable un-
der Leon, they are unconstitutional. 
The state legislature indicated that if any 
part of section 77-3.5-12(g) was held inval-
id, the Fourth* Amendment Enforcement 
Act wou\i "be void in its entirety." H.B 
69, 44th Leg . Bud. Sess., 1982 Utah Laws 
ch. 10. § 16. Thus, our holding that the 
substant'i! violation requirement violates 
the fourth amendment of the United Suites 
Constitution renders invalid all of the stat-
utes p .*-$<. d in the Fourth Amendment En-
forcement Act. We therefore do not need 
to disc\$s the trial court's failure to make 
findings as to the office* s' good faith * 
Because we affirm on other ground^ the 
trial court's order suppressing the evi-
dence, we do not reach the issues raised by 
defendants concerning a possible Miranda 
violation and the officers* lack of statutory 
authority to stop defendants. 
tution We do not analyze the leve! of conduct 
required b> Utah Constitution article I, section 
14. We reserve this question for the future 
STATE v. MENDOZA 
Cite as 748 \\2d 
The decision of the trial court is af-
firmed. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs. , 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring). 
I join in the majority's analysis. How-
ever, I feel compelled to add several com-
ments. 
First, I find particularly outrageous the 
State's attempt to justify the stop of Men-
doza and Mendieta by citing the fact that 
they reacted anxiously to the pursuit and 
surveillance conduct of the two INS offi-
cers. In the 4:50 a.m. darkness on March 
16th, Mendoza and Mendieta were driving 
along 1-15 in the left lane. Suddenly, a car 
approached from the rear at a very high 
rate of speed. When it approached the 
Mendoza/Mendieta vehicle, it abruptly 
slowed down and then trailed Mendoza and 
Mendieta at freeway speeds, separated 
from their rear bumper by only two to six 
feet. Only the headlights of the officers' 
car were illuminated. In the dark, there 
was nothing that would alert Mendoza and 
Mendieta that the vehicle behind them was 
a police car, Mendoza and Mendieta then 
pulled into the right lane and slowed down. 
At this point, they appeared "nervous" to 
the officers. 
Any sane person would appear nervous if 
something like this occurred while travel-
ing along a ''. lely stretch of one of our 
interstates in he early morning hours. I 
find ludicrous/ the State's argument that 
because these individuals appeared to have 
been unsettled by the officers' extraordi-
nary conduct, the officers had justification 
for suspecting that something improper' 
was going on, and on this basis, they were 
entitled to pull the vehicle over and insti-
tute an investigation that led to a search of 
the vehicle. This is pretextual fourth 
amendment gamesmanship at its worst. 
Second, I agree with the majority that 
the "good faith" exception suggested in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), cannot be 
applied generally to warrantless searches. 
1. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
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However, even if this realding of Leon were 
in error, the Fourth Amendment Enforce-
ment Act would not necessarily be saved. 
As I have observed previously in State v. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 2ljl-74 (Utah 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring), the whole 
question of the protections that are afford-
ed by and the remedies available under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, our own search and seizure provision, 
has never been carefully considered by this 
Court. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring 
and dissenting). 
Application of the deadly erroneous stan-
dard of re\ prompts me to concur in 
affirming the judgment of the trial court. 
However, I reserve judgment as to whether 
the exclusionary rule as espoused in Unit-
ed States v. Leon 2 has application to a 
warrantless search. I dlso reserve judg-
ment as to the constitutionality of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35~12(g) (1982) and wheth-
er it has application t|o a warrantless 
search. 
HOWE, Justice: (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur except I would not reach and 
determine the constitutionality of section 
77-35-12(g), also known als rule 12(g), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The majority 
correctly holds that the good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary jule enunciated in 
United States v. Leon, 46S U.S. 897, 104 
S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), cannot 
apply to the warrantless search made in 
the instant case. For the same reasons 
and because of the inherent lack of good 
faith in their making, section 77-35-12(g) 
does not apply to such searches. See sub-
paragraphs (3)(ii) and (iii) of section 78-35-
12(g). 
I would not attempt to apply the statute 
to a fact situation it was hever intended to 
cover (warrantless searcjh) and then be-
cause it is unconstitutional as there applied, 
declare the statute unconstitutional in all 
2. 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 
(1984). 
STATE v. GALLKGOS Utah " 2 0 7 
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challenge. Second, the damage done by seizures pursuant thereto, are prima facie 
wrongly deciding this case and encourag- reasonable. 
ing more ex-spouses to bring on baseless 
attempts to change custody far outweighs 
any harm to the Shioji children that would 
attend a reversal. We cannot let the fact 
that these proceedings have dragged on 
dictate the law we enunciate or the result 
we reach. Custody of the children should 
be returned to appellant. 
DURHAM, Justice, concurs in the dis-
senting opinion of .Justice ZIMMERMAN. 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Ross GAfJ.ECOS. Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 20319. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 20, 11)85. 
Defendant was cor, vie ted in the Utah 
District Court, J. Robert Bullock, J., of 
theft by receiving, and he appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that (1) 
Fourth Amendment requirement that items 
to be seized be particularly described in 
search warrant was abridged, and (2) police 
could not enter defendant's home based 
upon search warrant and while there initi-
ate and conclude independent outside inves-
tigation to achieve probable cause to seize 
unnamed property. 
Order denying motion to suppress re-
versed and case remanded. 
1. Searches and Seizures 0 7 ( 5 ) 
Search of constitutionally protected 
area uv iuant to valid search warrant, and 
2. Searches and Seizures <^3.5, 3.7 
Decision to seizp must be judicial, as 
opposed to administrative, and search war-
rant must be sufficiently particular to 
guide officer to th in i intended to be seized, 
thereby minimizing danger of unwarranted 
invasion of privacy. 
3. Searches and Seizures *S^=>3.7 
Line between what is and what is not 
sufficiently particular in search warrant 
must be drawn with 
ment of constitution 
a view to accomplish-
lal purpose of minimiz-
ing danger of unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy and necessarily varies with circum-
stances and with najture of property to be 
seized. 
4. Searches and Se 
Without subset 
search warrants de 
in generic terms a: 
law. 
zures <£=>3.7 
antial justification, 
^cribing property only 
not favored by the 
5. Searches and Seizures <£=57(8) 
Fourth Amendment requirement that 
items to be seized b t particularly described 
in search warrant was abridged by warrant 
which required seiz 
erty." U.S.C.A. Co 
ure of all "stolen prop-
nst. Amend. 4. 
6. Searches and Se 
Assuming that 
cer was properly h 
warrant, and thus, 
scription prov ided 
VCR and tapes was 
(zures <fc=>3.8(2) 
[affidavit by police offi 
corporaled into eareh 
validated gener-I de-
n warrant, seizure of 
still not within scope of 
warrant since affidavit listed only such 
things as lawn chairs, electrical wiring, and 
children's swing as ("stolen property," 
7. Searches and Seizures 0^3.8(2) 
When, in course of performing lawful 
search for items listed on warrant, officers 
come across other Articles of incriminatory 
nature, that property may be properly 
seized under plain view doctrine. 
8. Searches and Seizures 0 3 . 3 ( 4 ) 
Warrantless seizure of property in 
plain view after lawful intrusion is justified 
Appendix vii 
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if officer is lawfully present where search 
and seizure occur, evidence is in plain view, 
and evidence is clearly incriminating. 
9. Searches and Seizures <S=*3.8(1) 
Police could not enter home based 
upon search warrant and while there initi-
ate and conclude independent outside inves-
tigation to obtain probable cause to seize 
unnamed property, particularly where 
there was nothing about the nature or 
physical character of property seized that 
rendered it inherently identifiable as being 
stolen. 
Randall Gaither, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Sandra 
L. Sjogren, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
A jury found the defendant, Ross Galle-
gos, guilty of the crime of theft by receiv-
ing,1 a third degree felony. On appeal, the 
defendant seeks a reversal of the trial 
court order denying his motion to suppress 
evidence and for a new trial. 
I. 
On July 17, 11)8-1, Provo City police offi-
cers went to Gallegos' home in Provo to 
execute a search warrant. The warrant 
ordered seizure of "all controlled sub-
stances and stolen property." An affidavit 
in support of issuance of the warrant stat-
ed that an "informant did see within the 
last 48 hours at least one pound of marijua-
na and several items proported [sic] by 
Gallegos to be stolen . . . (lawn chairs, elec-
trical wiring, children's swing, etc.)" at 
Gi^Vgos' home. 
Khile searching the home, Officer Craig 
GeFjiison noticed a Magnavox VCR, at-
tached to a television set, and two video 
tapes close by. He asked Gallegos about 
them, and Gallegos remarked that he had 
rented them from Norton's supermarket. 
Geslison called the police dispatcher and 
asked her to Verify this information with 
Norton's. Norton's assistant manager ad-
vised the dispatcher that Norton's had not 
rented the V^R based on the fact that 
there was no rental contract on file under 
the name of Gallegos or Gallegos' girl-
friend. This inquiry took from ten to fif-
teen minutes. After receiving this infor-
mation, Geslison examined the VCR and 
discovered that the serial number was 
missing. When the defendant and his girl-
friend were unable to produce a rental re-
ceipt for the V 
mine if the VC JR was in fact stolen. Even-
tuallv, ownership of the VCR and tapes 
was traced to Sounds Easy, an audio-video 
store, which reported them stolen from a 
customer's truck. 
Prior to triajl, the defendant made a mo-
tion to suppre 
of the VCR ai 
jss evidence of the discovery 
id the tapes in him home on 
CR, Geslison seized the VCR 
and the tapes. A review of the record 
indicates that | none of the property indi-
cated as bein^ stolen in the affidavit was 
seized by the Officers. 
The following day, Geslison called sever-
al stores in the Provo area, trying to deter-
the grounds that the seizure exceeded the 
scope of the warrant and that the plain 
view doctrine was not applicable. The trial 
judge seems Up have agreed, but denied the 
motion based on the State's argument. 
The prosecutor argued that Officer Gesli-
son. while lawfully in the defendant's 
home, initiated an independent investiga-
tion which provided the officer with proba-
ble cause to seize the VCR and the tapes. 
The prosecutor made the same argument 
during the defendant's trial, and the de-
fendant was found guilty of theft by re-
ceiving. 
II. 
At the outset, it is important to note that 
this Court wilj not disturb the ruling of the 
trial court on questions of admissibility of 
evidence unless it clearly appears that the 
1. I'.C.A., 1<J\"*, § 76 6-403 (Supp. 198*5). 
STATE v. GALLEGOS 
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lower court was in error.2 Accordingly, 
this Court may affirm the trial court's deci-
sion to admit evidence on any proper 
grounds, even though the trial court as-
signed another reason for its ruling.3 
Therefore, we must address whether the 
VCR was seized within the scope of the 
warrant and, if not, whether its seizure 
was justified by an exception to the fourth 
amendment's warrant requ'rement, 
[1] The fourth amendment protects peo-
ple from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures of their person, home, papers, and 
effects.4 The amendment's proscriptions 
apply with equal force to the states.5 A 
search of a constitutionally protected area, 
as was the case here,6 pursuant to a valid 
search warrant, and seizures pursuant 
thereto, are prima facie reasonable. 
At the hearing on the motion to sup-
press, the defendant appears to have con-
ceded that since the officers entered the 
premises pursuant to a search warrant 
there was a valid entry* and search.7 
Therefore, the only issue in this case is 
whether the seizure of the tapes and the 
VCR was justified under the fourth amend-
ment. 
[2,3] The SU\te first argues that the 
property seized was within the scope of the 
warrant. The fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution requires that 
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the . . . 
things to be seized." This portion of the 
2. State v. Cole, Utah, 674 P.2d 119, 122 (1983). 
3 . Sec Stale v. flryan, Utah. 709 P.2d 257, 260 
(1985). 
4,._, See U.S. Cons!, a m e n d IV. 
5X Stale v. Kent, 20 Ulah 2d 1, 5. 432 P.2d 64, 66 
VI967) . 
• i 
6. See Katz v. United Slates, 3*9 I . S . 347. 351 n. 
8, 356, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511 n. S, 514. 19 L.I-d 2d 576 
(1967); State v. Folkcs, Utah. 565 V 2d 1125, 
1127, cert, denied, 434 V.S. 071, °S S C l . 5?3. 54 
I..i:d.2d 461 (1977). 
7. Because of counse l ' s e o n c e ^ i o r u r rc.-ei not 
address the good faith excep t ion to the exclu 
amendment is essentially a proscription 
against general warrants whereby adminis-
trative officers determine what is and what 
is not to be seized. The decision to seize 
must be judicial, as opposed to administra-
tive, and the warrant must be sufficiently 
particular to guide the officer to the thing 
intended to be seized, thereby minimizing 
the danger of unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy.8 Accordingly, the line between what 
is and what is not sufficiently particular 
must be drawn with a view to accomplish-
ment of the constitutional purpose 9 and 
necessarily varies with the circumstances 
and with the nature of the property to be 
seized.10 
[4,5] In this case, the warrant ordered 
seizure of "all controlled substances and 
stolen property." Without substantial jus-
tification, warrants describing property 
only in generic terms (terms applicable to 
an entire class of property) are not favored 
by the law.11 However, use of such de-
scriptions has been allowed when a more 
specific description of the things to be 
seized is unavailable. Thus, general de-
scriptions have been held sufficient 
fi]n cases involving contraband, such as 
drugs. . . . [i]n cases where the inherent 
nature of the property sought by a war-
rant precludes specific descr ipt ion. . . . 
[m cases] where attendant circumstances 
prevented a detailed description from be 
ing g i v e n . . . . and [in cases where a] 
detailed description has been difficult 
and the evidence established that the sto-
sionary rule. 
— U.S. 
(1984). 
See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 
104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 
8. State v. Tidyman, 30 Or.App. 537, 568 P.2d 
666. 670 (1977) (citing Marron v. United Stales, 
275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231 
(1927) ) . 
9. SU-e, e.g., United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 
733 (5th Cir .1981). 
10. See f\nrle v. Hannon, 90 IH.App.3d 753, 755, 
46 111 D e c 27, 29. 413 NT-.2d 467, 469 (1980). 
S< e a ho Stare v. Townsend, 394 F .Supp. 736, 
746-47 ([• .D.Mich.1975). 
11. See Cook, 657 1 .2d at 733. 
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len goods sought are likely to be part of 
a larger collection of similar contraband 
located at the premises to be searched.11 
Since none of these recognized exceptions 
apply to the portion of the order requiring 
seizure of all "stolen property," it is obvi-
ous that the fourth amendment require-
ment that items to be seized be particularly 
described was abridged in this case,M 
[6] It has been held that a general de-
scription on the face of a warrant nay be 
cured by proper incorporation of a suffi-
ciently descriptive supporting affidavit.14 
Assuming, without deciding, that the affi-
davit by Officer Eagan was properly incor-
porated and thus validated the general de-
scription on the warrant, the seirure of the 
VCR and the tapes was still not within the 
scope of the warrant; the affidavit lists 
only "lawn chairs, electrical wiring, chil-
dren's swing, etc."-as being stolen proper-
ty. 
III. 
[7] The State alternatively argues that 
the tapes and the VCR were properly 
seiz. d pursuant to the plain view doctrine. 
Ordinarily, only items de>cribed in a search 
1
 : , rant may be seized.15 However, when, 
p. , l e cour.^ e of performing a lawful search 
U>r items lifted on a warrant, officers come 
across other articles of an incriminatory 
nit'ire. ihat property may be proj^rly 
^ . \ nder the plain view doctrine.11 
The plain view doctrine is grounded upon 
the proposition that when an object is in 
plain view there is no fourth anu ndment 
search.17 Accordingly, in actualiu the doo 
12. Kamcn v. State, A h - l a App.. 665 V 2d 557, 
561-62 (19S3) ( footnnlr* omi t ted) . 
trine merely provides grounds for seizure 
of an item ^'hen access to an object is 
properly justified under the fourth amend-
ment The dwner's only remaining inter-
ests are tho$e of possession and owner-
ship." 
[S] Because this Court is sensitive to 
the inherent danger that officers will use 
the plain vie\v doctrine to enlarge specific 
authorization to seize into a general war-
rant to rummage, we have previously 
adopted a modified version of the guide-
lines laid down in Coolidge v. New Harnp-
shire19 Thus, a warrantless seizure of 
property in pla|in view after a lawful intru-
sion is justified if: "(1) the officer is lawful-
ly present wh|ere the search and seizure 
occur, (2) the evidence is in plain view; and 
(3) the evidence is clearly incriminating." 20 
There is no question that the VCR and 
tapes were in| plain view and, a- »<<•>• ed 
above, the defendant conceded thai P ( of-
ficers were lawfully present. The o. f. id 
ant, however, aj-gues that the incrirmnaiur} 
nature of the property was not "immediate-
ly apparent" This language from Cool-
id pc is in substl 
requirement not| 
be "clearly incr 
tin nee contained in the third 
:d above that the evidence 
|minating." The clearly in-
criminating requirement also mandates 
that officers have probable cause to associ-
ate the property to be seied with criminal 
activity. 
(9) The scope, of this requirement must 
be determined b|y balancing the intrusion 
on fourth amendm< nt interests against the 
promotion of legitimate Ptvernmental in 
16. 5vr S-He v. Romero, LtO V2d 715, 7IH 
(1^53). 
13. S.c Surr.en. 665 >\2J a! 562-6?. Kinney y
 | 7 w S:a{c y AfimW;, 23 l i a h 2d 62, 65 • 5. 
Sun: OUCr im. 602 I 2d 240. 242 (1970). 2W.
 4^7 r : d 6 l 3 6 1 5 | n > 5 ( 1 9 6 9 ) > 
I J J;,VC, Search and Secure § 4.6(c). at 102 | 
(1978). See also U>h Sales, Inc. v. AVu York , g v T y [i A(yQ v s 7 , 0 7 , Q l 0 ) 
442 U.S. 319. OQ sCt . 2319, 60 LTd.?d 920 <.
 C | n c . < , , j , f yd 2 J ,02 { v m i 
(1979). !" 
14. Set 2 W. U l ^ c S , , r , h and Sci.-urc , 9 t ° 3 l ' S " M ' S C l 2022, 29 !. YA 2d 5M 
§ 4 >•';*). J : KO n 23 (1975 L S.;;-p H5S). ( ^ ' 0 -
15. Sre Si^ie \ Cnffm. I iuh. t2t V 2d 475, 452 20. S ~'.e \ /?t.";« rJ l i ah , 6'«0 V 2d z\ 71fc (f «.* 
(1951) (WMVinv J , c..:u. .-ri-gV r v * .d). 
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terests.21 The State of course has a valid 
interest in gathering and seizing evidence 
of criminal activity in order to suppress the 
lawless element of our society. However, 
the public has the right to be free from 
unreasonable seizures by the State. Al-
though this Court does not interpret the 
"clearly incriminating" requirement as re-
quiring that evidence be "clearly incrimina-
ting" at first glance,12 to allow police to 
conduct r~» off-premises investigation to es-
tablish piubable cause to seize property not 
designate u in the search warrant is clearly 
unacceptable under the fourth amendment 
Here, Officer Geslison testified that at 
the time he first saw the VCR he had no 
information that the video recorder had 
been stolen. The record indicates that Of-
ficer Geslison only had reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that the recorder was stolen 
after having a dispatcher follow up the 
defendant's claim that he rented the ma-
chine from Norton's. At trial, Officer 
Mock testified that the inquiry through the 
police dispatcher took from ten to fifteen 
minutes. Officer Ge<lison's suk-equent 
discovery of the missing identification num-
ber and discovery the next day that the 
property was in fact stolen, did not di.ssi-
pate the original ta in t Affirmance of this 
type of police investigation would have the 
proscribed effect of allowing police to 
search under a general war ran t 
Police cannot enter a person's home 
based upon a search warrant and while 
there initiate and conclude an independent 
outside investigation to achieve probable 
cause to seize unnamed property. This is 
particularly true in a case such as this 
when nothing about the nature or physical 
character of the property seized rendered it 
inherently identifiable as being stolen. 
The order denying the defendant's mo-
tion to suppress the evidence seized is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for a new 
trial. 
STKWAKT, HOWE, DURHAM ano /IM 
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
2\. Delaware r Pmuse. 440 I' .S 64S t*>A. 99 
S C t . 1391, \39t>, 59 L I d 2d 6 ' 0 (1979). 
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Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant C. 
Croft, J., of manslaughter, and he appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held 
that: (1) self-defense instruction was prop-
er, and (2) evidence was sufficient to sup-
port finding that defendant had not acted 
in self-defense. 
Affirmed. 
1. Homicide <^7 
Absence of self-defense is not one of 
the prima facie elements of homicide. U.C. 
A.1953, 76-2-401, 76-2-402, 76-5-201, 76-
5-205. 
2. Homicide c-=»241(3) 
Although self defense is a defense in 
homicide prosecution, procedural rules that 
govern its pleading and proof are largely 
influenced by constitutional requirements 
that State must prove criminal act beyond 
a reasonable doubt. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-402. 
3. Homicide <£=>244(3) 
Defendant is not required to establish 
defense of self-defense beyond a reason-
able doubt, or even by preponderance of 
the evidence; thus, jury may acquit even 
though evidence of self-defense fell far 
short of establishing justification or excuse 
b\ a preponderance of the evidence upon 
the ob jec t . IJ.C.A 1953, 7(>~2-402. 
22. S<t' Texas v flmnn, AhO I ' S Jt 741. 103 
S C t . .it 1S42. 
